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Philosophy is sometimes accused
of being the only

discipline within which progress
is never made, and that

accusation is lent what plausibility
it has by the fact that
philosophers are, to a significant
extent, embroiled in the

same general debates that occupied
their predecessors one or
two millennia ago, no one having
yet come up with the

definitive word on most of them.

There are, however, except-

ions, and Alvin Plantinga is
largely responsible for one of

the most recent.
The issue

m

question is the argument from evil versus

the free will defense.

Although interest in this issue has

intensified during the last two decades,
efforts from both
sides

(

Plantinga

'

s

excluded) during that time have, it is

argued, been inadequate.

Against that bacKground, Plantinga*
will defense is examined and criticized.

s

most recent free
In the course of

that examination a number of issues concerning
subjunctive

conditionals, possible world semantics, modality, world

vii

theory interpretations of the
concept of choice, and the
notion of justification are
confronted and discussed.
The conclusion argued for is
that although there are
features of Plantings'

s

own defense which might be
contro-

versial, a modified Plantigarian
free will defense can be
formulated which not only
incorporates none of those
features, but which for the first
time offers the defender

adequate responses to some
particular forms of the argument
from evil, and which also permits
the theist to concede the
existence of unjustified evil,
yet still successfully to

maintain his theistic position.
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INTRODU ction
Philosophers and non-philosophers
alike have long perceived a certain tension
between the claims that
Sod exists
and that evil exists, and
this tension has been the
basis for
* Varlety ° f arsUmen ts
evil, the structure of
the argu'

ments being a function of
the arguers' view of the
nature of
that tension - whether it
be logical, probabilistic,
epietemological, or illusory.

Arrayed against those who
think that some form of the
argument from evil tells
decisively against the existence
of
3od are the proponents
of a variety of theodicies and
defenses,

who advance a battery of
considerations designed to show
that
the existence of evil does
not close the question of
Sod's

existence

Any discussion which attempted
to deal with ail the
currents of the debate would of
necessity be either monumental
or cursory, so the present
discussion has been arbitrarily

limited to philosophical arguments
attempting to establish

logical inconsistency in the claim
that both God and moral
evils exist, on the one hand,
and to the free will defenses

on the other.

The first chapter contains a survey
of the major arguments

from evil presented during the past
two decades, as well as
the main lines of criticism which
have been developed against

X

thoae arguments.

Although some of the counter
-arguments are
seen to be inadequate for
showing difficulties in the
arguments from evil, it is
argued that all the
evil^rguments do
fail in virtue either of
incorporating an unacceptable
view

of omnipotence, of neglecting
to take account of the
concept
of justification, or of various
formal shortcomings. It is
argued (after Plantings) that
the most that can be required

of an omnipotent being

is the

ability to bring about anything

such that it is consistent
that that being bring it about.

Many of the arguments from evil,
however, contain demands
that omnipotence imply the ability
to bring about any logic-

ally possible situation whatever,
which demand cannot, in
view of the foregoing, be supported.
first chapter is

a

Also contained in the

discussion of the notion of justification

as it might apply to God.

In general, if an evil is justified,

the relevant agent cannot be accused
of lack of goodness

simply in virtue of allowing such an
evil to exist.

Arguments

designed to show that this notion is
inapplicable to God do

not hold up, and if such justification
is even logically
possible, many arguments from evil fail.

The second chapter commences with a statement
of a

representative free will defense, and the major
types of attack
upon it are examined.

The defense is, loosely, that God might

have had reasons for allowing evil which are
tied up with the

xi

value of human free will and
freely generated moral
goods
(and with the view
(admitted at least for argument
by most
of those on both sides of
the Issue) that free choices
cannot be causally determined
by anyone - God included).

Mjor

The
lines of attack upon this
sort of defense are (i) that

It is inconsistent with
theism, and (ii) that the
defense is

simply inadequate.

None of the first type turn out
to be

unanswerable, and the arguments
attempting to show the
second trip almost en masse
over complexities involved in

application of the omnipotence principle
set up in the first
chapter.
There is, however, a difficulty
for the theist.

J. L.

Mackie once suggested that the free
will defense could not
be viable because God could simply
temporarily remove an

agent’s freedom when He foresaw that
otherwise the agent
would commit evil, and otherwise
leave the agent free.

The

standard theist reply is that God's
following that policy
would constitute the complete removal
of freedom in any

meaningful sense.

At the end of Chapter II it

is argued that

the theists' reply is defective, and that
the objection can-

not be so lightly tossed off.
The third chapter is devoted to discussion of
Plantings *s

most recent free will defense.

The first part of the chapter

consists of a non-critical recapitulation of
Plantings'

arguments and Intuitions.

The basic intuitions are
first

that since Sod cannot determine
people to freely do right,
and since He does value human
freedom, all He can do is
create free people and then
let them do their own thing,
and second, that it. is logically
possible that with respect
to each possible person,
were Sod to create that person,

that person would perform evil.

Were that possibility

actual. Sod would be unable to
create a free world devoid

of evil yet populated by free
persons, even though He was
omnipotent.
There are to date only two sorts
of criticisms in
print.

One is that the defense is inadequate
in that it

still allows us to demand that God
have created onxy moral

instantiations of all these obstreperous
persons.

It is

argued in a slightly different context
in the second chapter

that that sort of objection is ill-founded.

The second is

that while on Plantinga's view God can
be unlucky, that can-

not be

a

divine trait.

It is argued that this objection is

somewhat misdirected relative to present
purposes.
In Chapter IV, a much closer look is taken at
Plantinga'

position, and it is argued that his views on, uses
of, and

arguments about subjunctive conditionals similar to

Were God to create

S,

S would do evil

have certain undesirable features which make his defense

xiii

weaker than it need be.

In particular, although many
phil-

osophers hold that on the orderings
which are central to
most world -analyses of subjunctives,
worlds can tie in
similarity, Plantings does not
allow that.

It is also often

denied that for any. two true
propositions A and B, it is

true that were

A

the case then B would be.

arguments presuppose that that is
true.

Plantings 's

It is also argued

that a principle which Plantings
employs concerning the

notion of ability

defective.

is

Also discussed are a

number of issues which arise concerning
various mixtures of
worlds, the concept of choice, and
modality.

An informal reconstruction of the
Plantingarian defense
is

then suggested.

It is argued that the modified defense

is both adequate and

Plantings'

a

free from the questioned features of

original defense.

Finally, in Chapter V a more formal version
of the

suggestion made in Chapter IV is offered.

In addition to

making lesser demands on the theist, the modified
defense,
it is argued, does more than the traditional
defenses, and

more than Plantings

's

original defense.

It is argued that

for the first time the theist can frame a
successful

response to the Mackie objection of Chapter II, and further
that the Plantinga -style defense offers the theist - again
for the first time — the basis for a defense against
which

xiv

even the admission of the
existence of unjustified evil
(on
the usual view of 'unjustified')
is not fatal.

1

CHAPTER

I

Although disputation concerning
aod and evil has been
going on for a number of
centuries, there is still such
a

of agreement over what the

flies

lack;

has been about that it has
now

become almost a commonplace that
there is no one problem of
evil, but a number of distinct
problems.

It has been claimed

by some that
(1)

There is an omnipotent, omniscient,
and wholly
*
good aod

and

(2)

There is evil

are logically incompatible and that
that incompatibility constitutes a problem - at least for
the theist.

others have

granted the consistency of
(1) and (2) but have seen (2) as
strong evidence against
(1), and have formulated anti-theistic

arguments around that,

still others have denied that the prob-

lem has any logical dimension at all,
asserting that it is

rather a purely human problem of
reconciliation - of resisting,
in the face of evil,

the advice of Job's friends to curse
God

and die*
The first charge is of basic importance
in an obvious way:

if (1) and (2) are jointly inconsistent,
then the remaining

issues quickly become trivial.

something of

a lull

In view of the fact that after

the last two decades have seen a

new bar-

rage of arguments designed to establish
inconsistency, it would

2

be premature to cons id er
any of the other questions
without

examining the first.
The current round In the
dispute was opened by J.
L.

Mackie

OJ

in 1955.

Hankie asserted that 'several
parts of

essential theological doctrine
are inconsistent with one
another' and the parts in question
turned out to be 1 and 2
(
)
).
(
The contradiction, Mackie
admitted, did not 'arise immediately'

from

(

1

)

and

(

2 ) but could be explicitly
brought out by the

addition of a number of 'quasi-logical'
rules, of which Mackie
gave two as follows:

and

(5)

Good is opposed to evil in such a
way that a good
thing always eliminates evil as
far as it can

(4)

There are no limits to what an
omnipotent thine
&
can do.

Mackie continued:

'From these it follows that a good
omnipotent

being eliminates evil completely, and then
the propositions
that a good omnipotent thing exists, and that
evil exists, are
incompatible'

•

Mackie evidently viewed (J) and

(

4 ) as obvious enough to

make arguments for them superfluous, and others
who maintained
the inconsistency of (1) and

(

2

- e.g., H. J. Mcoloskey [llj

)

apparently did not feel that
(J) and

(

4 ) merited even the pass-

ing mention that Mackie had accorded them.

Nevertheless, the truth of
everyone.

(

5

)

-

and (4) was not clear to

Most philosophers accept the view that even omnip-

otent beings are subject to the strictures of logic, and thus

5

(A) must be read to mean
that there are no non-logical
limits
to what an omnipotent thing
can do. It is perhaps

initially

tempting to try to accomodate
that adjustment to (A)
(relativized to God

)

in the following manner:

(4a)

l*
the

U

is P° S8ible that
S, then God can make it
case that S

But (Aa) has not gone unchallenged.

The first suggestion

of dissatisfaction seems to
have come from S. A. Grave
[A]
although Alvin Plantings fl
7 ] first explicitly criticised
something like (Aa).

,

We can adapt a Plantings criticism
and

note that while it ia possible
that some specific

s is

the

case but not made so by God,
God cannot make it the case that
S

is the case but

not made so by God.

Plantings then offered the following
replacement
If God marces 5 obtain is possible,
then God,
being omnipotent, can make
S obtain

by which he meant that if it is
possible that God makes it the
case that S, then God can make it
the case that 3 .

(4b)

begins to look likely, but as we
will see at a later point,

application of it can present pitfalls
for the rambunctious.
But (4b) will serve Mackie for the moment,
since there
seems to be nothing contradictory in
God's making it the case

that there is no evil.

There are any number of ways that the

absence of evil might be guaranteed - for
instance, by the
omission of creation.

Presumably, if (5)

i8

true, then God

would makte that guarantee, although hopefully
by other than

the indicated means.

4

But

18

(

5 ) acceptable?

Before attempting an answer,
we

Kust see that
(?) Is not unequivocal.

(J) could be construed

as either

or

(5*)

Good is opposed to evil in
such a way that a good
thing always brings about
the b 98 overall situation it can

5 b)

Good is opposed to evil in
such a way that a good
thing always eliminates every
evil it can

(

and the general direction of
any particular argument from
evil
will depend in part upon which
of the above is employed.
In order to generate a
contradiction using either
(5b), at least one further
premise is needed.

If

(

5 a)

(

5 a) or

is the

route of choice, then it must
be held that
(Ac)

and

(

The best situation God can bring
about is free
from evil

5 b) can be used effectively only in
conjunction with

something like
(

^

)

uod can eliminate every evil

Of course, if
virtue of either

(

(

1

)

and (2) are to be shown inconsistent
in

3 a) and

(4c) or

(

5 b) and

(4d), both of which-

ever pair is employed must be
necessary, or follow from
(2).

(

1

and

)

Although there are some exceptions which
will be discussed

later, there is little unhappiness even among
theists with
and (4d

)

Dissent arises, however, over

(

3 b) and

(4c).

(

3 a)

The

case against the necessity of (4c) can be
most clearly made out
in connection with free will defenses,

so discussion concerning

5

it will be deferred, and
present discussion will center
on

(

5 b)

As a matter of fact,
(Jb) seems to be the reading of
(?)
that most of those who have
propounded arguments from evil

(following Plantings, the term

'

refer to them) have had in mind.

atheologian' will be used to
The evidence (which is more

or less circumstantial, since
many atheologians have stated

their premises even less precisely
than Mackie's (5) and
is

(

4 ))

first, that although a number of
atheologians have explic-

itly appealed to or argued for (Ad),
no such attention has

been turned upon

(

4 c) within the context of an
atheological

argument, and second, that theiets have
repeatedly attacked
(

5 b),

and atheologians have just as
repeatedly taken such

attacks as assaults on their position,
instead of pointing out,
as would be natural were (5a)
the employed principle, that

such attacks were wide of the mark.

Others have flatly admit-

ted the non-necessity of (5b) and
then have given up inconsis-

tency claims.

More direct evidence is provided by the fact

that there has been at least one attempt to argue for
a variant

of (5b).

That attempt will be discussed shortly.

Criticisms of (5b) are widespread, and generally
follow a
pattern.

The backing intuition of the attacks is that surely

a being would not be held censurable for
refraining from pre-

venting some evil if that prevention entailed the non-realization of some good that was sufficiently greater than that

6

attainable in the faoe of the
prevention (or destruction or
absence) of that evil, if
any such
evil

my

be called a

justified evil, then the claim
could be made that a being
could retain the title 'good'
despite not frustrating evil
ao
long as the evil involved is
justified. Thus with respect
to
a justified evil, (Jb) might
be false just because (}a) is
true

We should note that one person
3 might not be censurable
for permitting or bringing
about some evil e, even though
some

other person

3'

might be.

For instance, if

3

were a surgeon

and s' not, there are oases
in which 3 could without acquiring

moral reprehensibility inflict
pain of surgery, but
not.

s'

could

Thus when the notion of justification
is introduced

into a context where moral worth is
being assessed, that

notion of justification must be
relativized to the relevant
agent's powers, skills, etc.
The case in which we are interested is
that of God - an

omnipotent, omniscient being - so from
here on it will be
assumed that God is the relevant agent in
any discussion of

justification.

Of course, given that God

is omnipotent and

omniscient, it might be objected that this
justification

escape-clause is not applicable to Him.

To that, Nelson

Pike [l5] responds
As a general statement, a being who permits (or
brings about) an instance of suffering might be
perfectly good providing only that there is a

7

morally sufficient reason for
his action.
Thus it
does not follow from the
claim that God is perfectly
7
good that He would prevent
suffering if He could
God might fail to prevent
suffering^ or Hims^f
bring about suffering while
remaining perfectly good
It is required only that there
be a moral y
sufffcie^t
y auincient
reason for His action.
PiKe sees the issue revolving
about the logical status of

An omnipotent and omniscient
being would have no
morally sufficient reason for
allowing [evTlf

(5)

If such

a

morally sufficient reason for
an evil is a justifica-

tion of that evil, then if i
P ke is right if it is possible
that
evils be justified then
(Jb) is not necessarily true.
Thus unless

necessity matter?

(

5 ) is necessary,

(Jb) is not.

Why should the

As Plantinga points out, those
who attempt

to show that (1) and

(2) are inconsistent must do so using

only (1), (2), and whatever necessary
propositions are
relevant.
(

6)

The relevance of (Jb) is inarguable,
but if

o( evil

is justified)

then the necessity of (Jb) is lost.

We could, of course,

modify (5) further to
(

5C

)

A good thing always eliminates
unjustified evil
as far as it can

but in the absence of a case for the
existence of unjustified
evil,

the a theological usefulness of
(Jc) is unclear - even

were it granted necessity*
tjiven that if (6)

is

true (Jb) is not necessary, various

moves are available to the atheologian.

Some have admitted (6)

and, having seen Its
implications for (Jb), have
abandoned the

inconsistency claim.
H. Hare (e.g., [loj

For instance, Edward
H. Madden and Peter
)

believe that

•
•
claiming that 'there is no
morally sufficient
reason for an almighty God
to allow any'instan
of
evil
is necessarily true
.
.
.
would be absurd.
•

«

while Antony Flew
[5] maintains that

V

•
the evils of the world can
perhaps ... be
shown to have been one and
all, in fact the logice0eSSary 00ndiUon8 of realized
higher-order
goods?

Allowing for varying interpretations
of 'justified', both
of the above seem to be admissions
of (6). Madden, Hare, and
Flew further hold, however,
that the claim that all actual
evi
is justified is 'extremely
implausible' and develop various

arguments from there,

of course, in these cases the ground

rules have been changed in
that (2) is no longer the crucial

accusation, so their further
arguments will not be explored

he:

The loyal atheological adherent
to (}b) can follow either

of two main strategies.

He can claim that (Jb) is contingent

but follows from (1) and
(2), or he can hold out for the

necessity of (Jb) despite the foregoing.
attempted the former.

Mo one, it seems,

has

Given that Mackie, at least, seems to

have held (Jb) to be 'quasi-logical
'

,

that is not surprising.

Additionally, the prospects of deriving
(Jb) from (1) and (2)
if (5b) is contingent look bleak.

9

The a theologian who holds
that (Jb) is necessary has

three options:

(i) he can try to show
that (6) is false,

thereby saving his position
from the challenge of the
moment,
(ii) he can try to establish
the necessity of
(Jb) directly,
or (iii) he can admit
(6) true and still claim that he
can

use (Jb) to show that
(1) and (2) are inconsistent.
The last option does not look
promising,
it is one of the more
popular.

oddly enough,

For instance, McCloskey

[ll]

responds to a proposed defense
against the charge that
(1) and
(2) are inconsistent by saying
8eri ° U
ef90t in the [P ro P° 9 ®d defense
is
thit'itl
! ?
that
Itj can at
best show that moral evil may
have
-= k
a justification.

But of course, if the defender has
shown that much, he has
shown Kackie's original argument
deficient, and McCloskey
explicitly embraces that argument,

what McCloskey cites as

a defect seems to be that it
can do no more than it needs to

do in order to refute his
position.

Attempts along line (ii) are
people willing to assert that
(Jb)

a

bit sparse.
is

There are

necessary, but although

there is, as mentioned earlier, one
attempt to present an

argument, it seems to be the only one.

Bradley [l]
(5b).

,

It comes from R. D.

who also asserts the analyticity
of something like

Bradley propounds a variant argument from
evil employing

as a premise

10

(

7

If God is willing that evil
exist, then He is not
perfectly good.

)

Although never made explicit,
it

is

clear from his comments

that he is using 'willing' in
such a way that Sod is willing
that evil exist just in case
it is false that He would
prevent
all evil if He could.- In support
of (7) Bradley argues
Since there is presumably no
contradiction in the
supposition that there should exist
a God who is not
Willing that evil should exist,
and such a logical?!
possible aod would seem on any
ordinary criteria to*
be morally superior to a God
who is willing that
evil should exist, it follows
that" the latter sort
of uod cannot, without conceptual
inconsistency, be
described as wholly or perfectly
good.

But any God who would eliminate
all the evil He could might
well find Himself also lowering
the net amount of good in the

world were the evils in question
justified evils, and in that
case it seems that there are
'ordinary criteria' which do not

dictate that the refraining being be
held morally inferior.
Thus if Bradley is going to appeal
to ordinary criteria, he must

show that those criteria dealing with
the permitting of justified
evils are somehow defective, irrelevant
to God, or irrelevant
to

his argument.

He does none of these.

His argument also leans heavily on the
following sort of

inference
(6)

A

is superior to B

thus (9)

b

is not perfectly good

The legitimacy of that is not clear.

It is widely held that

11

there is no beat possible world,
(i°)

ie

^or any world w » there is
some world
t-nat w
is superior to w

w'

such

For all that, it may be
perfectly all right to hold that
there
are worlds - infinitely many
of them, in fact - that deserve
to be called perfect -worlds

The a theologians who opted to
retain the view that
(1) and
were
(2)
inconsistent, and who took either
of the second or
third of the options sketched
earlier, were under no particular

compulsion to come seriously to grips
with the notion of
justification and its theistic employment.

The attacker taking

the first suggested route was
under rather more of an obligation
to do so.

In fact, there have been a number
of attempts to

explicate what 'justification' means
relative to God, and trys
have come from both sides of the
issue.

An early characteriza-

tion mentioned previously was one
by pike to the effect that
dl

i 0 justilied just in case
there is a
morally sufficient reason for it

That may be very close to correct, but
what it ie that makes
something a morally sufficient reason is
left unspecified, and
is

J
1

of little h elp in getting

a

line on the truth value of

(6) and, as Plantinga, Pike, and Dewey J. Hoitenga
[dj variously

point out, that is where one major issue
in the battle will

ultimately be settled.
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Plantings gave a somewhat more
detailed early notion of
justification. In hia [l
we find:
6]

J2

•

•

.

an evil state of affairs is
justified just

xn case it is false that for
every good that
entails it, there is a greater good

that does not.

In short, an evil is justified if and
only if there is some
good that entails it, and every
good greater than that good

likewise entails it.

That sort of view was spelled out
a bit more liilly yet
by Hoitenga who claimed that
justification involves the

following (taken fairly directly):
(i)

(ii)

(iii)
(iv)

the justifying good is dependent upon
the
specific justified evil

the good is obtainable in no way which
excludes the evil
the good outweighs the evil
the good outweighs any alternative good
achievable by non -evil means

The theist had been happy with the view that if
justifi-

cation was possible, then God could permit evil, but
Hoitenga
set out to demonstrate that the stakes were a
bit higher - that

if evil was justifiable and God existed, then
there just had to
be evil.

He says
For the justification of the evil that exists is
made in terms both of an assertion that some good
depends on it, and a denial that any higher good
not depending upon it is available instead. For
if evil may be justified, then, if God exists and
evil exists, it is justified;
... if evil is
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justified, then it is also
necessary, for it is the
necessary condition for the
good whlih, since God
all good, is therefore willed
by Him. Given His
goodness, together with His
omniscience and omnip^
otence, evil ie inevitable.

Exactly what is meant by 'inevitable'
is not spelled out,
usua 1 ly by p rnaK.es inevitable
Q' is meant that 'if
p then
Q'

has some sort of necessity
attaching to it.

Just what the

antecedent should be in this case
(that there is evil
course, the consequent) is not
clear.

i 8>

of

What is initially

assumed is that justification is
possible, that God exists,
and that there is evil.

That does indeed imply that there is

evil, and with whatever sort of
necessity is desired, but

that can hardly be what Hoitenga wants.

Equally trivial is

that if the evil that exists is
justified, then there is
evil,

so perhaps what Hoitenga is arguing here
is that if evil

can be justified, and if God exists, then
evil exists.

argument might be filled out this way;
containing some evil

e,

and a set

S

The

consider a world w

of morally alternative

worlds to w, determined by whatever definition
of 'alternative'
is

intended for condition (iv) above.

Let us grant that we

can consider each world in S to have associated
with it some

unique relative goodness quotient.

of the worlds in

S

The resultant ranging

will be a necessary one, and if it is the

case that for every world w' in 3, if w' is better than w
then

w'

also contains

e,

then it will necessarily so be the
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case, and (according to
35) if it ia oven possibia it
i= necesaary. Aaauma that it ia
poaaibla. Than thara ia
aoma e-contain-

mg

world such that avary
non-e-containing world in s is
inferior to it. God - if He ia
all good and omnipotent will

eschew creating an a-free
world, and will create some
e-containing world, if He does
so, there will, 0 f course,
be
evil.

'f it is merely possible
that evil be justified and
if God

exists , then there is evil.
The c nclusion is rather
unexpected, amounting as it does
to a claim that
(!) and
ia

(6) entail (2) - that if justification

even possible, then God does
not exist unless there ia evil.
A theist might not find that
disturbing,

but

I

do not feel

that that conclusion is one
that anyone can be compelled
to

accept.

Admitted, if S od does create

a

member of s, and if He

can pick any member of
s He wants to create, then
He should

undoubtedly opt for one of the
e-„orlds.

But wny thin* that

He has to pick from s, that it
is necessary that He do so?
Ia it possible that there are
sets of alternatives to other

evils having structures different
from 3 - ones in which the

top worlds are non-evil?

if a0 , then if God created from one

of them, He would maintain His
goodness even if He created

a

non-evil world, it thus being not
true - much lees inevitable

-

that there is evil even though God
exists and (since s has the
structure it does) it is possible that
evil be justified.

Thus
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uni ess every poasible world is
held to be a moral alternative
to every other world for
God, or unless it is held
that every

other poasible aet of alternatives
has an S-like structure,
the argument faila.
But there seems absolutely no
reason to
hold the latter, and at a later
point an argument concluding

m

effect that even in an omnipotent
being's case not every

world is a reachable alternative,
will be considered.

The point can be put in

a

slightly different way.

As

pointed out earlier, if justification
is to have any bearing
on judgements of the moral worth
of an individual, the

involved notion of justification must
allow for considerations

of the agent's powers, knowledge,
alternatives, etc.
However, the present characterization of
justification is a

purely logical one, containing no
restrictions on what worlds
figure into determinations that some evil
is or is not

justified.

That amounts to a presupposition that every world

counts as an alternative for God, i.e., that
God can create

any world He pleases.
discredited (4a).
uod

a

But that is a bit too close to the

In order for any reliable judgement of

goodness to come out of any argument involving a char-

acterization of justification, some restriction is going to
have to be placed upon worlds admitted as alternatives, i.e.,
the omnipotence presupposition is going to have to be tailored
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to conform to (4b).

There is also a more immediate
response that can be made
and that is that the incorporated
notion of justification is

incorrect.

For instance, (i) and (ii) on
Hoitenga's list

require that the justified evil be a
necessary condition of
the justifying good.

Although this requirement

is

commonly

found in analyses of justification another related instance
is

Roderick Chisholm's

[

2

]

- that began to appear to some

to be too strong a requirement for
reasons which can be

extracted from Plantinga's gloss of the standard
free will
d

efense

s

A world

containing creatures who are sometimes
significantly free is more valuable, all else being
equal, than a world containing no free creatures
at all. Now God can create free creatures, but
He cannot cause or determine them to do only what
is right.
For if He does so, then they are not
significantly free after all; they do not do
what is right freely . To create creatures capable
of moral good , therefore, He must create creatures
capable of moral evil; and He cannot leave these
creatures free to perform evil and at the same
time prevent them from doing so.
... Thus He
could have forestalled the occurrence of moral evil
only by excising the posibility of moral good.
[18]

p.

166-7

The above will get close examination later, but for the moment
the important point Plantinga makes is that a certain amount

of evil may be justified by considerations of freedom (and
freely performed good);

however, Plantinga does not believe

that freedom entails that there is evil.

It only guarantees
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the possibility of it.

In support of his position,
Hoitenga had said

If the existenoa of evil is not
an unconditional
r
n arbU r y accent (theists
would
reject
rsieot^his°
it seems to me,
this, it
with equal vi £0 r^ it
& ’
must be a conditioned necessity.

r

The claim is that if evil is
not held to be necessary, the
tbeist can cite justification
only if the justifying good
requires the existence of evil.

In concluding that, Hoitenga

rejects the 'arbitrary accident'
option out of hand.

We are

not told what an arbitrary
accident is, but if that and

necessity and conditioned necessity
are to be exhaustive and
mutually exclusive, presumably evil
is an arbitrary accident
just in case it exists, that it does
so is contingent, and no

justifying good entails that it does.

If so, Hoitenga has

underestimated the theist, since Plantings
plans to drive his

defense right through the arbitrary
accident gap.
The emerging view of justification was
also pushed by
Grave,

^

who sayss

1

Grave makes the writing of an orderly history
of the problem of
evil and the free will defense difficult
by being consistently one
to two decades ahead of his time.
However, his views seem to have
attracted relatively little notice, and his
[4] is referenced in
the literature perhaps only four or five
times, and sometimes
even then for marginal reasons. That may be
because his views
are rather tersely and compactly stated, and
their full sweep
can for the first time be easily seen in
the light of Plantinga's

recent arguments.
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J

5

- ie
point of the theiat'a reply is
that moral evils
are not necessary, but necessarily
possible, consequences [of the justifying good).

It was a view akin to this that
was adopted by Richard R.

LaOroix [7] in an attempt to show
that one could successfully
employ the first of the a theologian'

s

three options.

LaQroix

set out to show that it is necessarily
the case that all evil
is

unjustified, and gave this rendering
of justification:
J4

An evil e is justified iff preventing
e entails
preventing the possibility of moral good
which
outweighs it.

However,

does not seem quite right either.

The

'preventing the possibility' locution is a
bit misleading.

Logical possibilities cannot, as such, be
prevented (although
their actualizations often can be) so the
intent must be

closer to

J4

An evil e is justified i f
preventing e entails
preventing the realization of some necessary
condition of each alternative moral good which
outweighs it.

But J4' is still defective.

It might be that the neces-

sary condition of some justifying good was a disjunction
of
evils, all equally bad*

If any one of them were actual, the

condition would be met and that evil justified.

But we could

prevent that evil without preventing the good, by merely

allowing one of the other evils in the disjunction to exist.
However, we can perhaps let that go by and see if the argument
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by Lacroix is promising enough
in other respects to warrent

further refinement of J .
4

The argument comes down to this (all
premises are

directly quoted
(

11

)

Thus (12)

(15)

)

Joa exis ts (and created everything
ex nihilo and
in time)

If jod had not created, there would be
nothin?
&
but God
God is the greatest possible good

Thus (14)

If aod had not created, there would be nothing
but the greatest possible good

(15)

The greatest possible good is moral good which
outweighs any possible evil

Thus (16)

If jod had not created, there would be nothing
but moral good which outweighs any possible evil

(17)

If God had not created, there would be no evil

(18)

God need not have created

Thus (19)

God could prevent evil by not creating

Thus (20)

God could prevent evil without preventing the
realization of some necessary condition of every
moral good which outweighs any possible evil

Thus (21)

Every evil is such that preventing it does not
entail preventing the realization of some necessary condition of every moral good which outweighs
it

Thus (22)

If there is evil, then preventing it does not entail
preventing the realization of some necessary
condition of every moral good which outweighs it

Thus

If there

(

25 )

is

evil, then it is unjustified
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Notice first that the 'is' in
(15) allows (15) to be
read in more than one way.
For instance,

we might interpret

it aa
(I5 a

°r

God is the (morally) best possible
being

)

(ljb)

God

=

the greatest possible good

It looks, since (12) and (lj) are
supposed to imply (Ik),
as though

15 b)

(

is Lacroix'

intent, but

I

think that no

reasonable theist holds (l b), and it
certainly does not
5
follow from

(

1 ),

for although a being may be good,

claiming

that a good may turn out to be a being
does not seem correct.

Since no problem arises for the theist
unless the premises
are either theologically essential or necessary,
and since
(IJb) seems neither, we can assume that (l^a) is
actually

the desired reading.
(

Many would object to both (1>) and

15 b) on the grounds that the notions of a best possible

being or a greatest possible good,

litce

that of a greatest

possible number, are suspect, but that can perhaps be
put

aside for the moment.

If (lja) is intended, then (14) becomes
(14a)

If God had not created, there would be nothing
but the best possible being

Since (16) is to come from (14a) and (15),
(15) must also
be modified

:
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(15a)

If nothing exists but the best
possible being,
then there exists moral good
which outweighs
°
any possible evil

But (15a) seems also neither
theiatioally nor logically neces
sary.

Overall, the argument in its present
form does not seem
to establish

(

25 ).

If there was any conclusion to be drawn
up to this point
it was that the atheologians had
not been very successful in

carrying through their various chosen tasks.

There were a

number of people who thought that they knew
why - that on
rather general grounds it could be shown that
the atheologians
could not possibly make their case.

Cne such was William E.

McMahon [15 ] who held that the anti-theistic arguments
all
hinged on the intelligibility of the notion
of a better

possible world than this one, and denied that the notion
was in fact intelligible.

G. Schlesinger

|j>l]

made a some-

what related attempt to show that no matter what sort of
world God chose to create, the mere existence of evil could

never count against Him.

The argument:

(24)

There is no (logical) limit to the amount of
good possible

(25)

If there is no such limit, then it is not
possible to create that world having the greatest
amount of good

Therefore
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(26)

Ood cannot create that
world having the moat
good
Sod cannot create a acrid
having no evil

Thus (27)

might ask:
this one though?

why not create a better
world than

The reply seems to be that
that question is

pointless, since no matter what
world Cod created, the
same
could be asked of it. Thus
(28)

Sod is not to be blamed
solely because He
created a world which has
evil

Schlesinger concludes that 'the
mere fact' of the
presence of evil 'points to
nothing'.
is

backed by e.g., James Ross

In this conclusion he

20 ] and Charles Hartshorns

[

[

5]

.

However, it is not clear that
Schlesinger has made hie
case.

Although we can permit him the
move from (27) to (28),
that from (26) to 27 seems
(
to require
)

a premise to the effect

that
The absence of any (some) possible
good is itself
an evil

(29)

Evidently, (29) has been supported
by a number of philosophers.

Even some atheologians have come close
to it.

KcCloskey

[

For instance,

12 ] without specifying exactly
what he means by

'appropriate' says 'Absence of an
appropriate good is itself
evil',

it would be odd, however, to find a
supporter of the

argument from evil accepting
(29), since given the incompatibility

of some goods - eg Jones' suffering in
an inspirationally
noble manner, and Jones' never suffering
- (29) implies that it
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necessary that there is evil,
and given that,
(2) would
not count against much of
anything. Moreover, the
necessity
of evil would falsify (Ad)
forcing the atheologian to
give
up that, route entirely.
is

And (29) has another consequence
- one that has an
odd

ring to it.

If we grant that there are
some justifying goods

which entail evils, then the
absence of those eviis entails
the absence of those particular
goods.

Thus not only is the

absence of a good an evil, but
the absence of some evils is
an evil.
Finally,

(29) haa been flatly denied by some
philosophers.

For instance, Chisholm
[2] argues that the absence of a good
is not necessarily an evil,

adapt

a

but is, rather, a neutraL

To

case-type from Chisholm, the total
good in the

Western hemisphere would certainly
be increased were it the
case that there was a colony of
supremely happy Martian sand
crabs secretly and benignly living
beneath the Mojave Desert.

But were we to catalog the ills of
this hemisphere, the

absence of such a colony wouldn't make
the list.

Schlesmger

1

a

argument does not work without something

like (29), but at the very least
we lack a case for it.

Nicholas La Para [ 8 ] did not exactly see how
the
impossibility of

a

best possible world licensed God to create
an
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evil-containing world, and his
argument - though not
presented explicitly - seems to
be this:
Let S be the set of all of God's
creative
options (worlds).

Define

'a >

b'

as

'a is

better than

b'

Define 'Op' as 'it is obligatory
that
(50)

(

x

)(y)(x€

3a y£SA x>

That is not entirely unintuitive.

y

P'

^ 0^

(God

creates y))

If an agent can pick

from a number of options, he is perhaps
obliged to not pick
one of the inferior ones.

But there is, remember, no best
possible world, ie
(51)

(x)(x e 3

—

(*)(* e s

—> C< u(God

> (3 y)(y e s a y > x))

Therefore
(52)
(

52 )

jod has, of course,

n

creates x))

created a member of S if He

created this world, and thus has done
something He was, if
is true,

obligated not to do.

Thus, the goodness

claim in (1) seems compromised.
The argument is valid, and we can for present
purposes

accept (JO).

However, a second major and general area of

dispute can now be made out.

3 is

stipulated as the set of

all worlds that God can choose to create.
is no best possible world, does

best world in S?

Given that there

it follow that there is no

If every possible world is in

S - i.e.,

if
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God can create any world then we must admit that
8 has no
beat world. If it l8 not
the case that every world
is In S,

then we need some Independent
argumentation to show that
(Jl)
la true.
Recall that In arriving at (4b)
it was seen that

there were some possible worlds
that God, though omnipotent,
could not bring about. The
qualification in (4b) at the
time may have seemed innoououe,
but it cuts a rather wider

swath than expected, and Plantings
will use it in an argument to be examined later to
show that
(55)

(

3
ut

(where

'

>

1

w

) (

O

God does

A>

<^(3A)(God does

A >

A

(

(

51

)

world w is actualized)
world w is actualized))

is the subjunctive connective).

If (55) ie true - and
of

) (

I

think it is - then the status

is unsettled and the above
argument cannot be taken

as establishing anything.

about it in any case.

(

31

)

has a certain peculiarity

In the limiting instance where God

creates no contingent creatures, objects,
etc., it is still
the case that there is a complete,
consistent set of true

propositions.

Does that give us a world?

It might seem so.

Since God presumably has that option, is that world
in S?
Evidently.

Since God is, by the argument, obligated to not

bring about any other world, but is not, apparently,
obligated
to forestall that empty world,
in S?

is it,

then, the best world

If so, then it looks like La Para's conclusion implies
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the falsity of one of his
premises.

We should note that Schlesinger
also seems to pre-

suppose that there is no
significant limit on the order
of
(55) as to what worlds God can create.

Although some

might grant him that there is
no best possible world, if
there is a best one that God
can create, then the fact
that
for whatever world God might
have created there is a better

possible world comes to be beside
the point.
(We can now also see a bit
further into the deferred

response to the previously discussed
argument by Hoitenga.

If we consider what an agent

is

able to do instead of some

given option as alternatives to
that option, then again,
that every possible world is a
creative alternative for God
can be read as that God can create
every possible world.
(55) would rather disembowel his argument, since
(55) says

that there is at least one world
such that there is

nothing such that were God to do it,
that world would result.
In view of that, it would appear
that God cannot, as a matter

of fact, cause that world to be actual.)
Both La para and Jay F. Rosenberg
[19] suspected that

Scnlesinger was not on solid ground for
other reasons, and
directed the following sorts of considerations
against

Schlesinger:

(from Rosenberg)
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[ Let T be a type of world] In wbich
Intrinsic evils
e
n
“ hateVer the state of
that worid with
r
revard
ega rd to the
tt preaence or absence

of intrinsic s oods.

Where 'intrinsic evils' are
understood as 'positive disvalues,
not mere privations'.
The argument proceeds

M

(

3

(

35 )

God ought not create a world
of type T
God created a world of type
T

Thus (56)
and if so,

God is morally censurable
(1)

false.

i8

To begin with, it is not clear
that this argument con-

fronts Schlesinger at all.

His claim was that God, if He is

censurable, is censurable for something
beyond the simple

existence of evil.
to dispute that,

The above argument does not even
purport

but is geared rather to showing
that God is

culpable for creating a world containing
'intrinsic' evils -

which is consistent with Schlesinger

'

s

point.

But is Rosenberg's argument theistically
damaging in any

case?

The argument can be made valid, and
(35) seems to be

true - at least, theists would accept
it.

Most of us can

probably agree that there are worlds that
God ought not have
created, given other choices, and that were
we to discover that

our world was one of them, a strong anti-theistic
case could
be made (although some - perhaps Hartshorne
[5] - would dis-
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agree).

Of course, we might want to dispute
(54 ) with the

specified T.

If evil is justifiable, the case
for (54)

needs filling out, since it is not
obvious why God ought
to be censured

for evils which are justified.

Rosenberg

might borrow a line from Hoitenga,
and claim that just-

ification - at least in our usual situations requires
that there already be some given evil,
the remedying of

which justifies some further temporary
evil as

a means.

(For instance, the inflicting of the
pain of surgery may
be held justified only if there is
already some mal-

function requiring correction.)
prior to creation (ignoring

(

since there was no evil

29 ) for the moment) there

would be no need for the introduction of some
evil as
part of a remedial program.

I

original statement is correct;

am not sure that the
if the introduction of

evil into some states of affairs can result in a
raising

of the level of good, there seems no clear reason for
denying that the same process could

work: in cases

with a

higher starting point.
In any case, if there is only

3 ome

significantly

restricted proper subset of possible worlds that God,

though omnipotent, can create, and if every world in that
subset is such that it contains justified evil, or if the

29

best world (if any) does, it is
again not clear why God
is

under the obligation alleged in
(j 4 ).
The tacit presumption of the absence
of any such

significant restriction as
(55) would imply has gone

virtually unquestioned except by Plantings
(and possibly
Grave

[k]

- he seems to hint in that
direction, but his

remarks are a bit obscure on the point).

But if there is

such a restriction, the impact would be
enormous, partic-

ularly in conjunction with the post-pike
picture of justification.

That notion depends up.n

a

ranking of alter-

native situations (or worlds) by goodness.

If there is

some e-containing world above every world in
which
prevented, the evil is justified.

i-

8

is

If there is no e-

world so situated, the evil is unjustified.

that (55)

e

But suppose

true, and that evil e is unjustified.

Is it

possible that among the non-crea table worlds are all worlds

above some e-world?

Since we do not yet know what it is

that might make a world non-crea table, we can hardly give
a

flat 'no

1

.

But notice that if that is the case, then

the best world that God can choose is one containing not

only evil, but evil which on these notions of justification
is

unjustified.

Since that world is the best of those that

God can choose from, He should not, on our usual intuitions.
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be censured for creating it.

Thus, for all we know at this

juncture, if there are worlds that
God - though omnipotent -

cannot create, then even the
existence of unjustified evil
does not tell against His
goodness (or existence), and

Plantinga, as mentioned, argues that
there are such worlds.

Obviously, we shall have to examine
that argument, and will
at a later stage.

(Some might take the above as showing
that no one has
pinned down

'

justification' and it is easy to be
somewhat

sympathetic, since the characterizations,
by dealing only
in world rankings,

thereby either presuppose that God
can

create any possible world - which is
false - or else give
us a notion of justification which
is applied to God with-

out taking due account of His abilities which is a

deviation from any normal application of
'justification'
relative to some agent.

I

think that no one has managed

to formalize what may well be the
right intuition - pike's

'having a morally sufficient reason'.

Pike's version is also

the only one which explicitly acknowledges
that the notion is

ultimately agent-relative.)
In sum,

if the justification of evil is possible,
then

the charged contradiction between
(1) and (2) cannot be

demonstrated using anything like (Jb) - Mackie's first
quasi-
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logical rule.
logical rule -

If (55)
(

4

)

i8

true, then Mackie's second
quasi-

- is also rendered
unuseable, and the

popular presumption that we can
pick arbitrary worlds and

blithely claim them to be creative
alternatives for God
also has to be jettisoned,

since all of the foregoing

a theological arguments rely on
at least one or the other of

Mackie's rules, if
(6) and (55) are true, they all fall.
In Chapter II, some attempts to show
that freedom can

justify evil will be examined, as will
the major atheological
responses.

In Chapter III, Plantinga's support of
(55)

will be scrutinized.
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CHAPTER

II

From the literature one gets
the impression that the
theist feels an instinctive
defensiveness when discussing
the consistency of the
existence of God and evil,
yet when

discussion shifts to the most
popular of what might be
called attempts at constructive
proofs of consistency - the
free will defense - we seem
to get a role reversal:

the
theist relaxes while the
atheologian feels the compulsion
to scramble to Keep hie
position intact.

In fact, most

theists relax to the point of
feeling no need to even say

what the free will defense is.

Fortunately, Alvin Plantings

recounts what is probably the view
most theists would develone if they made their intentions
explicit:
A world containing creatures
who freely perform
both good and evil actions - and
who do more good
than evil - is more valuable
than a

world containing quasiautomata who always
do what is right because they are unable to do
otherwise. Now God can
create free creatures, but He cannot
causally or
otherwise determine them to do only
what is right;
or if He does so, then they
do not do what is right
freely. To create creatures capable of moral
^ood,
then, He must create creatures
capable of moral evil;
but He cannot create the possibility
of moral evil
and at the same time prohibit its
actuality. And as
it turned out, some of the free
creatures God created
exercised their freedom to do what is
wrong;
hence
moral evil. The fact that free creatures
sometimes
err, however, in no way tells against
God's omnipotence or against His goodness;
for He could
forestall the occurrence of moral evil only
by removing the possibility of moral good.
Plantinga flU]
p 1^2
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The atheologian, confronted
with that, can respond in
two
»ays:
he can show that essential
parts of the defense are
inconsistent with essential
parts of theism, or he can
try
to

uncover errors within the body
of the defense itself, and
a imply show it
inadequate.
It is obvious that no defense
essential parts of which

are inconeistent with claims
of Cod's omnipotence, ossiiecience,
or goodness can hold much
promise. A number of philosophers
have attacked the free will
defense on just that ground -

claiming in particular that
if there is either an omnipotent
or an omniscient being, there
can be no distinct free beings.
That there can be such beings
is, of course, basic to the
free will defense.

J.L. Mackie [8] offers some interesting
views along the
first line, including this argument:
.
.
.
there is a fundamental difficulty
in the
notion of an omnipotent God creating
men with free
will, for if men's wills are
really free this must
mean that even God cannot control
them, that is,
God is no longer omnipotent.

Wo might interpret this argument as
(1)

Will W is free

^
Thus (j)

O

i

—>

^0(God

controls W)

Will W is free

If so, it is not convincing.

—>

rJ

—>

rJ

controls W)
(God is omnipotent)

(God is omnipotent)

First of all, the employed

notion of omnipotence - that if God is
omnipotent He can
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control free wills even though it
is not possible, given
(1),
that He do so - is a dubious
one.
If it is not logically

possible that a free will be
controlled, then Sod

•

s

inabil-

ity to control one is certainly
irrelevant to whether or not

He is omnipotent.

In addition, there is

that (1) is mismodalized.

a

strong likelihood

If the term 'free

has any

1

function at all, then presumably there
are also unfree wills

which can be controlled.

3o

unless it is held that any free

will is necessarily so (and no one
has argued that) the

claim must be that it is not possible
that a free will be
controlled, but that cashes out as
(^•)

Q

rather than (1).

(Will W is free

3

(God controls W))

In short, if it is logically possible that

wills all be controlled, then
(1) seems false;

but if it is

not possible that they be controlled, then
(2) seems false.

If the consequent of (1) is supposed to be

a

denial of ability

rather than of logical possibility, then
(1) needs further

argument since it now may not follow from some general
principle about wills and omnipotent beings, but is only an
unsupported principle concerning a specific individual - God.

An objection similar to Mackie*s was registered by
Thomas McPherson tn]

.

This solution depends, among other things, upon a
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particular understanding of the
concept of omnipotence - depends, in fact, upon the
doctrine that
an omnipotent being can exercise
His omnipotence
in limiting His omnipotence*

McPherson goes on to talk about Sod
voluntarily assuming
a

'snaffle and bit'.

His omnipotence?
(4)

But if (1') Is true, how has Sod limited

It is true that

(S is a

bachelor at t

3

pj

(God brings it about

that

S

is married at t))

Does God thereby forfeit omnipotence by
creating bachelor 3

at t?

It does not seem so, and
(4) is an obvious parallel of

(!')•

Another attempt was that made by Antony Flew

[

5]

who

maintains that it is
.
.
.
entirely inconsistent to maintain . . . both
that there is a creator and that there are other
authentically autonomous beings.

The argument given is this:
(5)

God is creator

6

God is creator

(

)

=

(i)

God created everything
ex nihilo
and (ii) God is the constant and
sustaining cause of

everything

.

.

(7)

God is the constant and sustaining cause of everything =
Without God's ontological underpropping everything
would collapse into non-existence.

8)

Nothing happens independently of God's ultimate
undetermined determination and His
consenting ontological support

(
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(9)

There

is

no (human) thought, choice,
etc.,
independent of God a ultimate undetermined determination and His
consenting ontological support
1

10 )

.*.(

There is no autonomous being not
identical with
God

The key phrases are lifted directly
from Flew, and since
they are introduced without explanation,
the argument is

difficult to evaluate.

a

bit

For instance, one might think that

God could keep all the things
He created from collapsing into

non-existence without having to control
all possible events
involving those creations - and if so,
the argument fails but evidently the notion of ontological
underpropping is

stronger than that, since it is behind
the move from (7) to
But if it is that strong, then
(6) or (7) may not be

(8).

correct, in which case the argument is
not problematic for
the theiat anyway.

In any case, the decisiveness of Flew's case
has not

been established - at least, not in any obviously
decisive
way.

It has also been suggested that omniscience and
freedom

are incompatible.
been made by Pike
[19]

)

The strongest case for that position has
[ 12]

although others (e.g., Richard Taylor

have argued for related claims.

Pike presents a trilemma, but the following is the most

interesting and the most important horn, and is representative
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of the other two:
If God believed at t that 3 would
do A at t 0
x
then if it was within s's power at
t P to refrain
from A, then it was within
S' a power at
to do
something which would have brought
it about that
God did not hold the belief He held
at t .

(11)

u
x

But

It is not within one's power at a
given time to
do something that would bring it
about that
someone who held a certain belief at
a time
prior to the time in question did
not hold that
belief at the time prior to the time
in question.

(12)

From this pike infers
(

If God believed at t]_ that S would do
A at t P ,
then it was not within S's power at
t„ to refrain
2
from A

15 )

If omniscience is construed as Knowledge hence belief of all true propositions, then

3

seems to have lost the power

to refrain from anything he will in fact
do, and to do anything

from which he will in fact refrain.
The manner in which the premises are stated may
invite

accusations of scope confusions, so restatement may
be helpful.

Pike says

No action performed at a given time can alter the
fact that a given person held a certain belief at
a time prior to the time in question.
That means at least that
(P)(S)(S')(S believes at t, that P —> ^(3A)(S'
can do A at t p & (S' does A at t
ro s believes
P y
at t^ that P)))

(1^)

If we allow

'A'

repertoire,

(

to range over refrainings as being part of S's

14 ) implies

4o

(15)

sod believes at tj_ that
\.S can refrain from
^(3 refrains from
at t-^ that 3 does A

3 does A at t 0
*
a at t ?
A at t > cu God
at t );
2

—
believes

But of course, since God is
omniscient

U6)
Thus (17)

S refrains

from A at t

God believes at

>

~

Sod believes at
that S does A at t.

^

that S does A at t
2
d
refrain from A at t

—

t,

WS ban

The argument is valid, and
(16) appears to be a straightforward consequence of God's
omnrecience.

The intuition behind

(14) (which might be called the Humpty
Dumpty thesis) is clear -

done

done and there is no remedy for
that.

is

Pike obviously thinks that
(1 7 ) is relevant to discussions

of

freedom, and given God's omniscience,
that initially

S' a

looks plausible.
A at t

2

,

If 3 can't refrain from A at t
or can't do
2,

then how could 3 be free with
respect to A?

Let's consider some cases.
S

Suppose that in a fit of pique

demolishes his television set at t^.

given some easy assumptions)
program, which commences at t

Having done that (and

s

can't then watch his favorite

g

(immediately following

From that, however, it does not follow that
watched his program.

3

t^.

couldn't have

Had he merely chosen to vent his emotions

elsewhere, his set would have been intact and there
would have
been no problem.

Thus although the destruction pretty well

fixes things so that he now can't watch,
it is irrelevant to

whether or not he oould have
watched hie show.

Thus although

W© might agree that (for
appropriate values of p and A)

U«)

P at

—>

can't A at t

s

g

we must admit cases in which
(19)

P at t^

-/->

S

couldn't have A-ed

and thus (18) - even given
the truth of P at

- does not

^

aeem to have any interesting
consequences for S's freedom.
It might be objected that the
above example is unfair
8

in 06 the antecedent action
is one of S's own,

whereas the

real issue involves actions or
beliefs of others.

avoiding that can be given.
over to see a program with S.

But cases

Suppose that S's neighbor

If

S'

S'

came

watched the set at t
p

then at t S can't do anything about
2
s' having watched it at

V

But that obviously has nothing to do
with S's freedom to

decide whether or not

s'

watches his set at t
x

.

He could

have decided not to wait for his
regularly scheduled fit of
pique, and could have destroyed the set
before t

what implies a can't need not imply a
couldn'

,

.

Thus again,

yet the couldn't

seems to be what is of interest as far as
freedom is concerned.

Of course, it might be objected that
element is being overlooked.

a

crucial temporal

In the two cases given, the

reason why the couldn't didn't follow was that in
each case the

agent in question could have taken some action prior to
taken some other action at

t-^

t^

,

or

which would have resulted in some
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situation other than that
indicated by the antecedent.

In

(17), that is not the case, since
God has always had the

beliefs He has.

In that case, 3 would not
have acted prior

to every t^ at which God
believed that 3 would do A.

However, that does not seem
to establish much.

The

situation is roughly this:
(i)
1X

(

)

P at t^
(

—>

s

P at t
l

can’t at t
3 couldn’t have)
because
S could have done differently
prior
to t^

Given (17) and the eternality
of God's believing

(in)

God believes p at t
Q

—^

3 can’t

—>

3 couldn't have

at t

2

But what of
(iv)

God believes p at t
Q

Since (i) does not imply lack of
freedom, neither,
presumably, does (iii).

What is needed is (iv).

According

to the above argument, the crucial
fact is
(

v

)

^(S

could have done differently prior
to t

)

The argument might then be
(20)

(iv) is false because (v) is false
(paralleling (ii))

3u t

(21)

(v) is true
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(22)

(iv) is true

But that is not a good argument.

The only conclusion that

can be drawn is that if (iv) is false,
it is false for reasons

other than the missing falsity of (v).

The conclusion could be

saved if it could be
0hown that

(5)

(If (iv)

i8

false it is so because (v)
is false)

but no such argument is
advanced.

we can respond to Pike, then,
by saying that In order
to
establish his conclusion
concerning freedom he needs
to establish something like (iv),
and that he hasn't.
We might further
claim that (Iv) Is false
since Sod holds the beliefs
He does
only because He forsees what
choices will in fact be made.
Pike does reply to that.
He says that the response must
be
'incoherent' since his argument
establishes that foreknowledge
and freedom are incompatible,

since whether or not it does

that is what is at issue, that
does not seem to be an adequate
response.

Remaining to be met, however, are
challenges aimed at
the structure of the defense
itself, and they are not in

short supply.

Objections have emerged corresponding
to almost

every substantive claim contained
in the traditional view.
It is an essential claim of the
free will defense that a

world inhabited by free moral agents
who freely achieve some

(usually unspecified) ratio of good
to evil is superior to a
world populated only by unfree individuals,
regardless of how
we might be inclined to evaluate the
prevailing conditions in
the latter world.

As Mackie notes
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...

it must be argued that it
is better on the
6
Uld a0t freely and
>
err than
err,
thafth
th° should be
that they
innocent automata.
1

',

Although he seems to stand alone,
MoOloskey
to let that by unchallenged.

[lo]

refused

He says

It is clear than on omnipotent
God could create
rational agents predestined always
to make virtuous
decisions'; what is not clear is
whether we
should describe such agents as
having free will
.
.
.
Which is more desirable, free will
and moral
evil ... or pseudo-free will
[and] absolute
goodness? I suggest that the latter
is clearly
*
preferable.

And again
God, were He omnipotent, could
preordain the
decisions and the reasons upon which
they were
based; and such a mode of existence
would seem
to be in itself a worthy mode
of existence, and
one preferable to an existence with
free will,
irrationality, and evil.

Kany would object that without free will
there is no
goodness at all, but McClosicey could
accomodate that view with

only minor modification, by claiming that
non-evil determination
was superior to free will, irrationality,
and evil.

As

indicated, not many have been convinced that
there are some

mechanical modes of existence which are 'clearly
preferable'
to all modes involving freedom and some
evil (however little).

But even if a case could be made that that is in
fact true,
the import is not obvious.

To see why, we need to look at a

distinction first exploited

(I

believe) by Alvin Plantinga,

between a defense and a theodocy.

A person

attempting to show

that e.g., free will is in fact
the justification for evil
is
offering a theodocy; one arguing
that e.g., free will is a

possible justification for evil
is offering

a

defense.

Although some recent philosophers
have claimed theodicity for
free will (for instance, Hartahorne
[5]

)

moat of those whom

we might call 'defenders' have
been primarily concerned with

showing that free will was a
possible justification.

McOloskey has inflicted no damage.

If so,

Had he shown that his

preference was necessarily correct,
or that the defender's

preference conflicted with other
essential features of the
defense, his attack would have been

a

serious one.

argues for neither of these points indeed, he

But he

mkes

no such

claims - and as long as it can be
maintained merely that the

defender's view that a free world may be
mere valuable is
coherent, the defense is still viable.

Most of the objections directed at the free
will defense
have been more basic, being aimed at
the very heart of the

defense, and have been somewhat similar to each
other in

general outline.

For instance:

It may be argued that free will is compatible with
less moral evil than in fact occurs on various

grounds . . . these grounds establish that God
could have conferred free will upon us and at least
very considerably reduced the amount of moral evil
that would have resulted.' This is sufficient to
show that not all the moral evil that exists can
be justified by reference to free will alone.
McOloskey [lo]
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Y

° ould n °t God have
created beings with free
*
+
will who yet
always choose good and never
evil?
*

’

*

there is nothing

inherently impossible in
God b having created such
beings
if H e had,
the state of the universe would
be preferable to
its actual state.

...

McPherson [U]

If there is no logical impossibility
in a man's
ireely choosing the good on one
or on several
occasions, there cannot be a logical
impossibility
118
6ly ch008in £ the good on every occasion.
f!
!
there was °P en t0 Him the . .
possibility
1
of mkln £ beings who would act freely
but always
go right.
Clearly, His failure to avail Himself
of this possibility [etc.]
MacKie [8]

r^

.

The similarity is an important one, and
can be seen in a

slight recasting of the foregoin.

In McCloskey's passage we

seem to find
(24)

Thus (25)

0

(men are free and freely generate less
than n
amount of evil)

God could have brought it about that (men are
free
and freely generate les3 than n amount of evil)

In the Mackie section:
(26)

Thus (27)

O ( men are

free and freely choose good)

God could have brought it about that (men are free
and freely choose good)

Why should the defender worry about such conclusions?
Simply because if God could have guaranteed freedom without
permitting evil, then it cannot very well be claimed that the

value of freedom is the justifying reason for God's tolerating
evil
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Arguing that (24) and (26) arc false
does not look
initially promising, so if the
defender is to withstand this
Challenge, he should perhaps
find grounds for rejecting
the
inferences to (25) and
(27).
The first move is an easy one.

In earlier discussion it

seen that for purely logical
reasons we cannot require an

omnipotent being to be able to produce
just any logically
possible situation, but must be content
with
(26)

^(cj od brings it about that P)

God can bring
it about that P

Thus to get e.g., (27) what is needed
is
(29)

Q(God brings it about that (men are free
and
freely choose good))

McPherson is a bit ahead of the game
here, since what he
said amounts to
(29)

0 (God brings it about that (men are free and
freely choose good))

thus (50)

God can bring it about that (men are
free and
freely choose good)

This inference is warrented by
(26), and if (29) is true,
the defender is indeed in trouble.^

Recall that in Chapter I it was stated that
there were two
general routes over which an argument from evil
might go, depending upon what interpretation was given to
the 'quasi-logical
rule that a good being eliminated all the evil
it could.
One
reading was that a good being eliminated every
individual evil
it could and it was argued that this
reading ran afoul of the
notion of justification. The other reading was
that a good
being brought about the best situation it could.
It was pointed
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But la (29) true?

s.A. Brava

[4]

aaema to have been again

firat on the scene, objecting
that although It was possible
that men always freely
choose right, it was not possible
for
Bod to make It the case that
that situation obtained.

The question also came under
extensive review by Plantings
[l4]

,

who said

:

course, is not consistent;
for if
God brings it about that the^n
He creates always
^what is right, then they do not do what is right

Plantmga maintained that people were
confusing
(29a)

<>

(29) with

(God brings it about that (men
are free), and

those free men always choose good)

and although

lantinga was willing to grant the
truth of (29a),

that admission was of no particular
use to the atheologian,

since (29a) and (28) imply only that
God can create free men
A

battle of major proportions has been
fought over this

issue - whether or not God can determine
free choices - and
that this is a pivotal issue in evaluating
the free will defense
has been variously pointed out by Plantings
(e.g., [l4]

),

t u S h that
well be true, evil becomes a probl°pm onW
lem
only fi
if f?
it were necessarily true that the best world
God
could create was devoid of evil. Suppose that we continue
to
grant that all the best worlds are free worlds.
In order to
argue in this second manner, the atheologian needs to establish
at least that God - being omnipotent - can bring about a
free
world in which there is no evil. We have, in
(28), an analog of
Chapter I (4b) which appears to be an acceptable principle
concerning omnipotence, and we can view McPherson's argument as
an attempt to show that God could have created a free non— evil
world, that He thus did not create the best world He could have,
and ultimately that thus He is not good — i.e., as an attempt
to
develop the second line of argument.

Dewey j. Hoitenga Jr.

[7 ]

and Paul Helm

Although this
battle has not been conspicuous
for its arguments, neither
side has been baahflil about
putting forth its position.
Flew
[5]

,

[fij .

says that God can determine
free choices.

says that Flew is wrong.

determine free choices.

Plantinga [l4]

Hoitenga asserts that God can
too

Frederick Ferre'

[2 ]

comes back that

that does not include the sorts
of free choices that are

morally significant.

Ninian Smart

[l 8]

denies intelligibility

to the whole notion of
determined free choices.

Oddly enough, McCloskey seems
with Plantinga.

to be

among those siding

In the next to last paragraph
of [lo]

McOloskey says:
*
.
.
the question has not been fairly
put.
The
real alternative is, on the one
hand, rational
agents with free wills ... and
rational automata.

- whatever rational automata
might be.
As indicated, not ail the atheologians
have been inclined
to that degree of generosity, and
a serious attempt to show

that a version of (29) was true was
mounted by James E

Tomberlin and Frank McGuiness (henceforth

'JvicTom

McTom defined an A -property as

'of the form

"freely
(51)

a property

1

)

[20].

and argued that

0

(God causally brings it about that (some
A-

property is instantiated))

McTom undertakes to snow that

(

31

)

is true on any
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reasonable view of causation, and
tries to do this by showing
that (Jl) is true on both the
weakest and the strongest
reasonable views of causation,

since the correct view of

causation - whatever it turns out
to be - is thus bracketed,

McTom presumes that
(}1) will be true on that view as well.
The first view, McTom calls the
'physical necessity view'
and characterizea it aa
(52)

p cauaea q

= df

p is a

causally sufficient
condition for q

(the left aide can be symbolized aa

'

p

_»q»).

We are given

the further expansion
(

55 )

-^>q

P

iff

is true in every physically
possible world in which p is true

q

'where it is understood by the set of all
physically possible

— rlda

that subset of the set of all possible
worlds whose

members are exactly those possible worlds in which
the laws

of nature hold

1

•

This account of causation has problems, as McTom is

quick to point out.

It should be stressed that

(

52

)

and (55)

are intended by McTom only to put a floor under the weaker end

of the causal theory spectrum.

The problems with the view

itself will not become crucial.

Given this machinery, the following argument for
can be extracted

s

(

51

)

51

W

God creates free person
3

-*S

has some A-property

—> some

has some A-property

(

55 )

5

(

56 )

God creates free person 3

A-property is
instantiated

—>some A-property

is

instantiated

—?Q)

(

57 )

(P)(Q)((P

(

58 )

3od creates free person 5

(

59 )

(S)(P)(Q)(((S can cause p) & (p

some A-property is
instantiated

—

—

q))
can cause Q)

S
(

40 )

God can create free person 3

(

41

God can cause it to be the case that
(some Aproperty is instantiated)

(

42

)

0(God causes it to be the case that (some A-

)

property is instantiated))
and from that McTom concludes

(

51

)

<>(God causally brings it about that (some a-

(51)

property is instantiated))

There are some minor modifications we might wish to
make
in the argument, but by and large if we read
(5l a

)

0(God causally brings

(

31

)

as

it about that

instantiated

where

F

cisive.

is an

A— property, then the argument

is

(

3 F)(F is

)

perhaps de-

Unfortunately for the atheologian, no theist denies

(Jla) at all.

In fact, (Jla) seems true and most defenders

would gladly grant that.

What the defender is not about to

grant, however, and the only relative of

which is crucial to him is

(

51 a) the falsity of
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(51b)

0(3

F)(F is an A-property and God
causally
brings it about that F is
instantiated)

God can surely bring it about
that 3 freely does some-

thing or otnsr, which the above
argument supports, or even
that 3 freely acts, but that
argument does not establish that
for any relevant arbitrary
A-property - say,

freely choosing

good - God can causally bring
it about that it is instantiated.

McTom proceeds to argue for
(Jl) using the stronger view
of causation, but exactly the same
thing happens as happened
above.

Thus the relevant reading of
(51) - (51b) -

i8

not

established.
In [9] in reply to Grave's objection
to (29), Mactcie seems
to try to stake out a halfway position
between

(

29 ) and

(

29 a) -

softening the view to avoid the contradiction
he is ready to
recognize, yet retaining enough clout to
lay low the defender.

He says
If uheir being of this sort [free and untarnished]
is logically possible, then God's
making them of
tnis sort is logically possible, for there
is no
logical conflict between being of this sort and
being made. There would, of course, be a contradiction in the notion of God's making men freely
choose the good - if He maxes them do this, then
they are not free — but not in the quite different
notion of God's making men such that they always
freely choose the good.
Evidently, we are to distinguish between

and

(* 3 )

God maxes 3 freely choose right

(44)

God makes S the sort of being that freely
chooses right

5)

(Aj) is held contradictory,

(1.4)

not.

(44) is not

initially very clear, but it
presumably involves something

Uke

thiS

'

“ hUe 30,1

oannot

«Ae

S freely choose good.

He
can create 8 having some
(possibly subjunctive) property
or
characteristic - F - which is such
that everyone who does
have it does indeed choose rightly
freely unfailingly.

Now if God does make it the case
that

3 is F,

then although God does not make S choose
rightly, there is obviously

some link between God's creative
act and 3's subsequent choice

of right.

Consider a parallel,

my office mate is the sort

who, if hie Physics is misplaced,
will freely choose to vent
h ls frustrations non-stop in
Greek until he locates it.

The

ceremony is quite colorful, so,
wishing to share it with a
friend,

I

hide the Physics

the scene is played out,

I

.

There is a sense in which, as
have made him choose to tinge the

air, albeit in a weak sense of 'made'.

That sort of weak

sense is presumably the sort of thing
involved in God making
S

the sort who freely chooses right*

(^)
but

(

46 )

^ 0

Thus

(God makes
(strong sense) 3 freely choose
a
right)

6 (God makes w (weak sense) S freely choose
right)

(These sorts of distinctions are due to
Plantings.)
Let us look briefly at how the strong sense of 'makes'
works.

The following seem to be true for contingent
P and Q:
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(

47 )

I f S

5

ma kes P the case, and
g
p entails Q, then
makes^ Q the case

48 )

If

3 makes

(* 9 )

If

S makes
g p the case, and p implies Q, then
Q is -the case

(50)

That S make8 p the case, and
that P implies Q
8
but does not entail it, and
that S does not

(

s p the case, and S makes
it the
a
case that p implies
Q, then 3 ma kes
the
8 Q
case

makeg it the case that
P implies Q, does not
entail that 3 makes Q the
case
s

'P implies Q'

can be interpreted either
sub junctively or mat-

erially.
It is evidently part of Mackie's
story that

If s is

(51)

F,

then S freely chooses right

If (51) is an entailment, then by
(47) and (45)
(52)

cj

0 (God makes q

S is F the case)

So if (51) is an entailment, then if
God can make 3 be F,
it must be in the weak sense of
'make'.

But that will not

prove helpful.
The weak sense applies and the strong
sense does not in

just those cases in which some factor
other than the agent in

question must be taken into account - where
there

is

something

not under the agent's control which
figures into the case.

Otherwise, by

(

47 ) and

Thus if God can make

(

48 ), the strong sense would apply.

be F,
w 3

He can do so only in virtue of

reasons for which He is not entirely responsible,
and thus we
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have no guarantee that He
is morally required to
do so. If
those other factors are not
forthcoming, then God cannot
"ahe S be F, so we cannot
conclude that God can make u
even

weakly - s choose right#
Mackie presumably, then, has
to deny that (51) is
necessary, and hold that it is a
weaker statement. I f he does
so, he seems perhaps to be
in a position to claim that
God

make

0

S

be F, and that since it is
a contingent truth

that if 3 is F he freely chooses
right, then, by (49), he
will choose right freely but will
not be made to do so, and
B

hence the problem is avoided.
But we must look at (51) again.

If (51) is true in virtue

of God making, it true, then we do, via
(48), have the same
problem.

Thus (51) must be neither necessary
nor made

true
8

by God.

Indeed, under such conditions,
(50) says that the

problem has been avoided.

Unfortunately, there is another

problem just like the first one.
truth of (51) and S’s being p.

The argument depends on the
Yet God cannot be behind the

truth of both at once without running up
against (45).

He has

to take His pick and rely on factors outside
His control for

the truth of the other.

That being the case, God cannot guar-

antee anyone freely choosing right.

If God foresees that (51)

will be true, He can perhaps make 3 be
F and get the desired

result.

But that He can, if He can, does not follow
from there
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being -no logical conflict
between being of thle sort and
being
-ade', since the 'made' here
must be taken in the weak
sense.
Thus we need to be given some
view of (44) other than the
one
suggested, or reasons for rejecting
(47) or (48).
So Mackie's suggestion that
although God can’t make 3

freely choose right He can make
S of the sort that freely chooses
right, does not appear successful.
Whether or not some possible

person

3

would, if created, do only good,
seems to be something

that God simply cannot regulate - even
by indirection - within
bounds that would warrent ascription
of culpability to Him.

The outlines of the battle over
(29) can now be made out
a bit more clearly.

The defender insists upon
(45) and is

willing to grant (46).

However, given the nature of the weak

sense of 'makes', there is no principle
corresponding to the
clarified version of (28) - i. e .,
(28a)

0 (God makes 8

p the case)

employing the weak sense of 'makes'.
(28b)

0 (God

raaK.es

—> God

can (actually)
bring it about that
P is the case

It is false that

w p the case)

—> God

can (actually)
bring it about that
P is the case

Whether or not God is able to bring about P in this
case
depends, as stated previously, on factors outside
His control.

Those factors may materialize, but they also may not, and
if
they do not then God cannot as

a

matter of fact bring P about.
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Thus the consequent of
(28b) is contingent, whereas
the antecedent is necessary (given the
appropriate restrictions on
p).
Hence, (28b) is false. Thus
the truth of (46) is no
problem
for the defender.
The truth

of

(5?)

right

3 " brl " S

U

ab0llt

w

that men freel J' choose

might be problematic, but since
it can be a best contingently
true it cannot be used to
show either that the free will
defense has internal logical
problems, or that God and evil

are logically incompatible,
unless it can be shown to
follow
from theologically essential
doctrines. But no case for
either the truth or the theistic
essentiality of (5J) has been
made.
The above considerations more or
less parallel the

response to Ma Okie's position that was
composed by Plantings
[14]

Rowe

.

That response, however, was considered
by William

[17]

to be defective.

Rowe was willing to admit, in

effect, that both (45) and
(46) were true, and concedes the

contingency of (55).

These concessions notwithstanding,
Rowe

thougn that a successful atheological
argument could be distilled
from Mackie's remarks.

Up to this point, emphasis had been

laid only on the claims of God's
goodness and omnipotence,

but

now the claim of omniscience was also
enlisted, with the result
that the debate took a novel twist.

The argument;
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(54)

God is omnipotent, omniscient,
and wholly lyood

(55)

every free possible person
P who, if created,
would perform morally evil
actions, there is
another free possible person
p who is exactly
like P except that p'
if created, would never
,
perform morally evil actions
For-

1

(56)

If God is omniscient, then He knows
with respect
to any free possible person
whether that person,
f created, would or would
not perform morally
J
evil actions

(57)

If nod is omnipotent, then He can
create those
free possible persons who, if
created, would
never perform any morally evil actions

Given (54) we can conclude, of course,
that
(

5G )

God can create those free possible
persons who,
if created, would never perform any morally
evil

actions

Howe continues
(59)

Thus (60)

If God can create those free possible persons
who, if created, would never perform any
morally
evil actions, and if God is wholly good and
omniscient, then any free persons croated by
God never perform a morally evil action.

No free person created by God ever performs
morally evil action.

a

but (58) is what is of interest at the moment.

Does (58) or does it not presuppose that there are free

possible persons who, if created, would always freely avoid
evil?

It seems to, and that there are such is a point that

not all have been willing to concede.

Grave

|4j

was again the

first on the scene, both anticipating and answering the point,

saying
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h

16 n ° nece88aiy contradiction in Baying
th«\\h
that
there was open to God the
possibility of 'Lkimi
beings who would act freely
but always go right'.
For It might be meant not
that Cod could have Id
beings who would freely and
necessarily, but beinva
who would freely and contingently,
always go right.
“ Very P° asibl « ^ee agent
S
would
bohav
behave
in every combination of
oiroumetanoee, ought
° nly th ° 8S uh0 “ Ho oouU
"Ob causally
predict
edict, °hot
but see, as never once turning
P
away from
goodness. The trouble Is that
for all we know
there might be none ... We
are quite in the dark
about such hypothetical
actualizations of possible
tree choices.

A

bit la ter , plantings

1

14J

jection along this same line.

gave a much more explicit ob-

Rowe, however, wae not satisfied

with this basic sort of objection.

Noting first that

the substance of Plantinga's
reply to Mackie ia that
the proposition
^

)

God can instantiate possible
persons
containing the property of always
freely doing what is right

is contingent
[and that thus Mackie has shown
no
logical problem for the theist]

Rowe then points out that

(

[6l]

)

is

not a premise in the above

argument at all, but only the (rephrased)
consequent of (57).

Of course, that the consequent of

a

conditional is contingent

need not make the conditional itself contingent,
so if the

above is Plantinga's criticism, then if the
argument Rowe
extracts from Mackie is good, then perhaps
plaritinga has not

really had the last word after all.
But let u s see what happens if we make the
apparent pre—
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supposition of (56) a bit more
explicit by recasting
(^ 7 a)

(

57

as

)

if there are free possible persons
who, if
created, would never perforin any
morally evil
actions, then if God is omnipotent,
then God
can create those free possible
persons who,
if created would never perform any
morally
evil actions.

(58) is still available given
(54),

(55), and

There are free possible persons who,
if created,
would perform morally evil actions

(62)

But there are problems here.

If Rowe is to avoid the

charge of using contingent premises
himself - and he must, if

showing a logical difficulty with
either

(

62

)

(

1

)

and

(

2

)

is the object -

must be necessary, or it must be entailed
by

(

54 ).

It is not at all clear how
(62) - if contingent - is to be

derived from (54) and that option does not
seem viable.
the other hand, if

(

62

)

is necessary, then

(

62

)

and

(

On

55 )

entail that it is necessarily the case that there
are free

possible persons who, if created, would go right.

Now an

omnipotent being can make it the case that any possible person
exist;

what is not controllable is what sort of person that

person, once created, will turn out to be.

So if there are

persons such that they would of necessity go right if created,
then any omnipotent, omniscient being could necessarily bring
it about that there were free perfect persons.

that Plantings'
is

correct.

s

Yet Rowe admits

argument for the contingency of that statement

Perhaps we are meant to conclude only that it is
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necessarily the case that there
is seme free person
or other
who would go right if
created,

still, from that and

(

5 7 a)

we can conclude that it
is necessarily the
case that an

omnipotent being can bring it
about that those persons
exist.
But if what Plantings has
tried to show is that a
being can
be omnipotent and
omniscient and still be unable
to instantiate
free possible persons who
always do right - and it is
clear

that that is what Plantings
means for

(

61

)

to say - then

Rowe cannot hold the above
position and still agree that
Plant inga s argument ia correct.
1

Yet he says

Plantinga a highly original
argument that
is contingent is, I
believe, correct.
'

(

[6 l]

Evidently, then, Rowe must give
up the view that (62)
is necessary,

but if so, then he has not
produced an argument

that avoids Plantinga

's

charge of premise contingency.

But suppose that, despite appearances,
(62) follows from
some essential theological claim.

Given (62), (54), (55), and

(57a), we can conclude

There are free possible persons who,
if created,
would do no evil, and God can
create them

(65)

From

(

65

)

and (54) we are evidently to
conclude that no

free person created by God does
any evil - (60).

may not be a good one, i. e
., (59) may be false.

The inference

The intuition

Rowe seems to be relying on is that God
can look into the future,
see who does evil, and simply neglect
to create any such person.
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But we must ask - which
possible future does God look
into?

Different combinations of persons
delineate different worlds,
and one and the same person
may act differently in different

worlds.

5

opposite.

might do right in w and wrong
in

w'

,

and 5

*

the

If God can .create either w or w',
then it is true

that there are free possible
persons who, if created, would,
in the appropriate worlds,
do right.

either case God also gets

a

Unfortunately, in

bad guy.

Thus the truth of

(

65 )

does not, without a quantifier error,
help us get to the

conclusion that God can bring forth
do no evil.

a

world in which all men

God cannot just create parts of a
number of

worlds and glue them together to make
one.

And it will do

no good to protest that it is certainly
possible that God

bring about a world in which all men
freely choose right.

We've been there before.
There

is

one other specific problem with the argument,

and that is that (55) also seems to
be false.

Suppose that

Were p created, p would perform moral evil

According to (55), there

is

some P' sharing all of Ps

properties except that
(65)

Were

But if P and

P'
p'

created, P' would perform no moral evil

are just alike, with that exception, they

share among other things individuating essential properties,
and hence are one and the same individual.

Since no one can
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both perform and not perform
yc.ii.uim an act
,
*
act, the n
person
is question
ia uncr eatable.

One response might be to
separate P and

f>

into separate

Individuals, but that would make
a shambles of any hope
for

necessity that (55) might have.

Another reeponse might be that

if there were a world in which
P, if created, would do
wrong,
there is another world just
like it except that in in
P, if
created, would do right. That
suggestion ie unhelpful for

reasons to emerge shortly.
The argument under discussion
trades on the intuition
that God could, by selective
creation based on foreknowledge,

bring it about that only people
who would freely refrain from
evil would get created. That
intuition was, in various guises,

iuiriy widespread,

a version of it was employed by
pike
[

15]

and reconstructed - although not
advocated - by Peter y. windt
[2l].

As usual, it was directed against
Plantinga.

of places

mke 9

(

[l5],

[l 6]

)

In a number

Plantinga holds that since God cannot

a person have e.g., the property
fr eely chooses A or

have the property freely refrains from
A even though a person
free with respect to A presumably
has one or the other, the

creation of a free person is a two step
process.

God instantiates

P (the person in question) with all his
essential and determined

properties, and P himself has to make
the choice of freely

choosing or freely refraining from A.

If we can for the moment
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apeak of a possible person as a set
of properties, we can say
that there is a inaximum proper
subset the elements of which
God can actualize in creating
p.

Given e.g., (45), p will

have other properties that God
cannot be responsible for.
Given that, Windt provides a
simplified version of a

defense formulated by Plantings.
examined later;

moment.)

(This defense will be

the objection is what is of concern
at the

The defense:

Let P be a free perfect possible person
(freely
refraining from a)
Let P be the maximum subset of p that
x
God can
actualize (in a strong sense of 'actualize

1

)

(68)

Let
(6

>)

(^7)

I_

be P^'s instantiation

in order to instantiate P, God must
instantiate P^

There can be at most one instantiation of
P-^ contains individuating
properties

p,

,

since

it is possible that, if created, I would do
A,
and it is possible that, if created, I would
~

refrain from A

(

69 )

^

I would do A, if created, then if God creates
He cannot instantiate P

(70)

If God does not create

(71)

I

(72)

It is possible that God cannot instantiate P

I_,

He cannot instantiate P

^
would do A, if created, then God cannot
instantiate P

Windt continues
Since this argument can be applied to any possible
person including the property always freely does what

I
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ss.i.rxsTr-

better to have a world with
.orally f^ee persons
nd some am, than a
world with no freedom at
-“PPO- that under such circumstances, all we
Qod
W
would choose to instantiate
the best possible oersons
he can, though none of them
may be perfect.

J

The objection follows:
Let us grant that if I would
do A, if created, then
d
create I without allowing some
?
morll evil
to exist,
yet why cannot God simply
create some
Uati ° n 0f P
wh0 free ly would refrain
° ir ^ ?
and thUS W l'° would be an
instantiation
of P?
l

Wmdt

does not push the objection
and thinks that Plantinga

can escape, and in that

I

think he's absolutely correct,
since

the objection does not seem
to be a good one.

To begin with,

what is involved in claiming
that there are various instantiations of a possible person?

Presumably such things as

variations in non-essential properties,
or the inhabiting of

different worlds.

Of course, there cannot be more than
one

instantiation of any person in any give
world, so the objection

evidently involves

a

number of different worlds.

Suppose, then,

that we consider two instantiations of
P^ - p' and p"

.

pi

performs A, and p" refrains, and that is
their only difference,

aside from whatever that difference entails.
not share a world, put

P'

in w'

again differing only in that

A

and P»
is

in w", and whatever that entails.

in w"

Since they must
with

w'

and w«

freely chosen in

w'

and not

,

66

Mow tt
control

admitted that free cbcicee
are outside Sod's

is

for logical reasons.

,

pick between P' and P"

,

He

is

Thus, when Sod is ashed to

really being ashed to see to
it

that e.g., „» is the world
to be, so that when
P x is

instantiated, p n will result.

Unfortunately, the request is
impossible to grant.

In

the case specified, w' and w«
differ only in that A is freely

chosen in w', and freely avoided
in

w"

.

But it has been con-

that whether A is freely chosen
or freely avoided is not
in God's
w"

over

power.
w'

will, say,

Thus God no more has a way of
guaranteeing

than He has of guaranteeing that
p

freely choose A.

p

if created,

The suggestion boils down to a

proposal that God try to sneak up on
an ungraspable handle.

Stealth will not enhance the grip.^
We can now make out the deferred objection
to the last
proposal for saving the truth of
(55).

If (55) is given the

suggested reading it becomes
(55a)

For every free possible person P and possible
world w, if it is the case that were w made
actual then the resulting instantiation of
P
would go wrong, there is another world w
just
like w except that were w' made actual, the
resulting instantiation of P would go right.
1

(5ja) may be true, but that no longer implies
L

Grave [k] makes a point that may come close to this.
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(57b)

3 d B 01Dni-P o bbllt, then He can
bring it
about? that the appropriate

^

world w' exists

It might be argued that
3 od perhaps has some way of

pinning down a desired world,
but if that is the case
then the
presumption that worlds are only
individuated by their truths,

etc, must

be given up, and some
additional criterion added.

No proposals are handy.
(There is also a serious difficulty
involved in the way
in which subjunctives
are used in the last two
objections.
The general problem involved
will be discussed at a later
point.)
So far, then, the objections to
the free will defense

that God should have made men such
that they are perfect

although not making them perfect,
that Sod should have created
only persons He knew would go
straight, and that He should
have picked only the desirable
instantiations of those He was

going to create, have all failed,
as did the earlier objections
that omnipotence and free will
were incompatible, that

omniscience and free will were incompatible,
or that Sod should
have created automata#

There

is

one final objection to the free will
defense,

and its earliest recent statement
comes from Mackie [8].

Mackie more or less suggests that God borrow

a page

from physics

and employ an analog of Maxwell's
Demon, although given the high

purpose involved we might wish to employ
Maxwell's angel instead.
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Mackie says
Why should He not leave men
free to will rightly,
but intervene when He sees them
beginning to will
wrongly?
This is what Grave calls 'the
policy

•

•

.

of promoting

sham fights', and there is a
standard response to it which
most theiste have found
satisfactory:
To create creatures capable of
moral good, theretore, He must create creatures
capable of moral
evil;
but He cannot create the
possibility of
moral evil and at the same time
prohibit its
actuality
So He could forestall the
occurrence of moral evil only by removing
the
possibility of moral good.

...

Plantings

Clement Dore

[l]

is

[l4]

even more explicit:

If it is true that an omnipotent being
would have
intervened to prevent Jones from doing
wrong on
some given occasion, C,, had it been
the case that
otherwise Jones would have done wrong on
Ch, then
Jones had no real option with respect to wrongdoing
on 0j_:
he could not have done other than avoid
it.
Hence, Jones would not freely have avoided
wrongdoing on 0^.
The above sort of doctrine also figures
prominently in a

number of arguments that Dore presents in
support of the free
will defense.
It goes

All are related, so only one will be discussed.

:

Since these people
as well as perfect,

[free, perfect persons] are free
it must be that God would have

permitted their instantiations to engage in wrongdoing i they had so chosen. And there is no morally
relevant difference between the actions God would
have performed if these instantiations had been going
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to do wrong

i.e., actions of permitting
(
them to
wrong), and Sod
actual actions of permitting
the people whom He in fact
creates to go morally
astray. Now God would have
been justified in
r ° r “ lnS
he f ° rmer ' Hence it must
be false that
Jg i reprehensible
l
H
for permitting the latter
ones.
'

The argument seems to be something
like this:
(75)

(S)(S is free

(74)

S is

(75)

God would be justified in
creating 3 free and

God would not intervene even
were S to choose evil)

free and perfect

God would not intervene even were 3 to
choose evil

perfect

•'•(76)

God would have been justified
in not inter3 freely chosen evil

vening had

But as it turns out, God created
e»g.,

free person p

who did freely choose evil, and
(77)

God does not intervene even though
p freely
chooses evil

Says Dore, there is no difference
between God not inter-

vening in the case of
P.

S,

and His not intervening in the case
of

Thus

(7)

^ (God

is unjustified in not intervening
even
though p freely chooses evil)

The argument is not easy to evaluate.

Evidently involved

in the step to (76) is something like

(79)

"( 8 °)

A

B

is

justified in being such that A
justified in being such that 3

—

^-God is
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In the case of persons other than
Ood, that sort of

inference might lead to Oood
Samaritan type difficulties for instance, being justified
in being truly repentant for

evil deeds would entail being
justified in performing evil

deeds - but perhaps we can allow
that in the case of Sod no

such problems arise.
We can recast (75) as
(81)

God is justified in being such that
3 is free
and perfect

The locution is awkward, but will for
the moment suffice.
It is then possible to conclude that
(82)

Qod is justified in being such that He
would
not intervene even were 3 to choose evil

Something like that is evidently going on, since otherwise (75) and (74) would be irrelevant to
would be merely unsupported assertion.
to have gone wrong in any case.

(

76 ), and

(

76 )

But something seems

It might be that God was

justified in creating 3 in part because He foresaw that
3

would avoid evil.

How is His justification in that case

relevant to the case where God foresees that 3 will not avoid
evil, but creates 3 anyway?

Perhaps that can be made a little clearer.

(82) might

be read as
(

85 )

God is justified in being such (in free perfect
world w) that in the nearest world to w in which
3 chooses evil He does not intervene (in that world)
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Does it follow from that
that
(84)

In the nearest world to w
In which 8 chooses
evil, j0 d is justified In
not intervening

Dore's conclusion Is that
It must be false that
God Is
reprehensible for permitting the
evils that do exist. I take
it that what he means- is
that God's permitting evils
does not
itself entail reprehenaibility.
That conclusion could be

m

gotten from (84), since if
(84) is true then there is at
least one world in which God does
not intervene, there is
evil, and yet God is not
reprehensible.

But (84) may not follow from

Suppose that country A

is

(flj).

considering an unjustified and

reprehensible attack upon country
B.
attacked

is

Consider a parallel.

That country B is

not sufficient to justify the
destruction of the

world, and the ruler of country
c knows that country A would

not take such a risk.

In order to forestall the attack, the

ruler oi c publicly has an electronic
device implanted in hie

brain which has the following function:

if B is attacked, the

device will produce an irresistable stimulus
forcing the ruler

of C to push the ultimate button.

In short, the ruler acquiree

a certain conditional property - he
is now such that were B

attacked, he would blow up the world.

He acquires this pro-

perty knowing full well that it will in fact be
effective in stopping the planned attack.

Under the circumstances, he might
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be justified

in taking this course,
even though,

ex hypothesi.

an attack on B would not
justify the explosion.
In the same way, Sod might
be justified in being such
that were 3 to go wrong
He would not intervene, knowing
in

advance that He will not be
called upon to exercise the
property - out not be justified
in not intervening if
3

m

fact was going to choose wrong i.e., He might not be

justified in being such if He
knew He would be called
upon
"to

exercise the property.
If so, Dore's argument need
not be admitted valid.

But we can reject the argument
in any case because
(75)
is false.
The argument for
(7J) is just the passage quoted

earlier as a response to Mackie's
Maxwell’s angel proposal.
That passage asserts the inconsistency
of
(85)
(86)

and

(

87 )

Jones avoids wrongdoing on

0-^

Jones is free relative to the act
in question on o
x

Were it the case that were he to
be free he would
not avoid the wrongdoing on
then
0, ,
Jones would
not be (allowed to be) free relative
to the act
in question on 0
],

But (85)

arid

(88)

a

(89)

B

(90)

(B >

(

86 ) are consistent, and in general
if

then

and

^

A) >

^

B

Q (AaB)

75

are consistent (wh^rA i\
/
connective),
(91)

i

again represents the
subjunctive

in particular
(

(B >

~

A

)

>

ro

B)

-/-}

r^J

B

yet (75) asserts an instanee
of the negation of
(91) (transposed
But if (75) ls false, then
not only does Dore's argument
fell, but Mackie's objection
still stands. As a matter
of
feet, to this point, it has
not been adequately handled
by

theists.

However, we do not have the
machinery necessary to

evaluate Maoicie’s objection
just yet, so further discussion
of it will be deferred.

)
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CHAPTER III
The situation as it has been
developed to this point is
tnie:

the atheologians have failed
to establish that the

claim that both God and evil exist
is inconsistent and thus
have not refuted defenses in
general, and have failed to show
that the free will defense in
particular is defective.

defenders, on the other hand, have
failed to find

defense that will work.

a

The

free will

We apparently have a standoff.

However, there is one attempt to demonstrate
the viability

of

a

free will defense which to this point
has received only

incidental glances and which must now be
examined more fully.

The attempt in question is the most recent of
Alvin Plantings.

Plantinga's attempt is complex.

Before plunging into its

formalities it would perhaps be helpful to try to
see exactly

what some of the employed intuitions are.

Most of this chapter

will be devoted to a non-critical recapitulation of
Plantinga's

views, and will end with a discussion of what little
published

criticisms of Plantinga's defense there is.
The most convenient point of departure is the series of

transformations that Mackie's quasi— logical rule concerning

omnipotence underwent.

The original claim, recall, was that

if God were omnipotent then
(1)

God could bring about any situation whatever
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But since, of course, even omnipotent
beings presumably

have to observe logical laws,
God's omnipotence could not

guarantee anything stronger than
(2)

God could bring about any possible
situation

whatever

However, for reasons suggested by Plantings
and noted in

Chapter I, even (2) is too strong and must
be replaced by
(5)

God could bring about any situation consistent
with His having brought it about

It might not be immed iately obvious what effect
all this

might have on the atheological case.

It looks as though the

a theologian can grant the defender his predilection
for

worlds and still present a compelling argument.

free

It is, he

might say, perfectly possible that God create and the
result-

ant world be free from evil, yet contain free individuals.

Given that and (3), we could easily infer that God could have
caused such a maximal situation to be realized, i.e., could

have brought about such a world.
a theologian could

Once granted that, the

formulate the remainder of his argument

along standard lines.

Of course, arguing in that manner requires that we read
(5) as something like
(4)

0(God brings about

S)

—^

God is able to bring

about 3

At this pass, plantings springs an ambush, which can be
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take, as consisting of
two charges:

(i) that (4) is multiply

ambiguous and (ii) that once
the ambiguities are sorted
out,
there is left no version of
(4) that is both true and useful
to the a theologian.

Plantings'

s

Cur first task, then, in
following

trail, is to set out the
various renderings of
(4).

AS was seen in an earlier
section, such terms as 'cause',
males', 'bring about', etc.,
are ambiguous, having both
a

strong sense and a weak sense.
S,

Thus for arbitrary situation

(A) might mean

(Aa)

O'

(God brings about

5)

» God is able to bring

about 3 3
(4b)

0

(God brings about

Q

S)

>

God is able to bring
about,, 3
w

(Ac)

0 (God brings about

w

3)'

> God

is able to bring

about 8
(Ad)

O

(God brings about

s)

*

3

God is able to bring

about

w

3

(Since the variable in (4a) - (4d)
ranges over situations,
we run into no relevant problems
in considering maximal sit-

uations - i.e., worlds - and for the
present will simply construe

3 as

a

variable over worlds.)

uiven the ambiguity of ’brings about',
it seems that

Plantinga is right on count (i):

(A) is indeed ambiguous.

The

import of that, however, might not be
immediately evident.

The

atheologian needs only any one of the four
readings plus merely
the logical possibility of God's bringing
about (in the approp-
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riate sense) soma free perfect
world.

But aren't there free

perfect worlds that In any
(every) sense of 'bring about'
whatever, it is at least logically
possible that God bring
them about? Planting.'* answer
is 'no', and the reason
is
tied up in just what it is
for God to create a world.
[2]

In

Plantinga says

...

the creation of a world
containing moral
good is a cooperative venture;
it requires the
uncoerced concurrence of
significantly free
creatures. But then the
actualization of a
world w containing moral
good is not up to God
alone,
it also depends upon what
the significantly free creatures of w
would do if God created
them and placed them in the
situations w contains.
Of course, it is up to God whether
to create free
creatures at all;
but if He aims to produce
moral
good, then He must create
significantly free
creatures upon whose cooperation
He must depend.
p. 190

The view here is that God (or any
omnipotent being) can

strongly create or bring about only
specified parts of any
world containing free individuals.

God

cannot strongly make

other segments of that world actual
without destroying the
stipulated freedom of the individuals
involved.

Thus for any

world containing free persons, there
is some limit to how much

of that world God can be strongly
responsible for, or, we can
aay, there is a maximal segment
of that world that God can and

does strongly actualize in bringing
that world about.

Consider, for example, a world in which
a person P freely
chooses to do A.

If God strongly brings it about that
F chooses
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then that choice is not free,

A,

since the choice is stipulated

free in w, it is not poeeibie
that God strongly brings it
about
in w that P freely
choosea A. Thus it is not
poaaible that
God atrongiy actualize every
aigment of w, and hence it is
not
poaaible that God atrongiy bring
it about that w ia actual.

The same can be eaid concerning
any free world whatever,
and conaequently (4a) and
(4b) are of no use to the
atheologian.

They are, no doubt, true, but no
concluaion about God's being
le to create specified free
worlds can be gotten from then
for the simple reason that
their antecedent can never be
true

with respect to free worlds.
(4c) does not look any more
helpful,

since if what has

just been said is right, the
consequent of (4c) has to be

false.

If it is not possible that God bring
about

some

free world w , then we may conclude
that He (and any other

omnipotent being) is not able to do so.

Thus either the

antecedent of (4c) - and hence also (4d) is false, or else,
or else (4c) itself is false.
(4d

)

If the former, then (4c) and

become just as useless and (4a) and (4b),
and it begins

to look as though the sketched
atheological argument contains
a

faise premise in the form of an assertion
that it is at

least possible that God bring about a free
perfect world.
will presumable be admitted, then, that (4c) is
false.

It

That

might be admitted anyway, on the intuitive grounds
that the
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possibility of achieving some end
in collaboration with other
beings need not entail anything
about achieving that end in
the absence of such collaboration.

We are left, then, with (Ad).

Plantings will admit the

truth of the antecedent for arbitrary
world

but will be

w,

obliged to argue that there is no
entailment between antecedent and consequent.
Why, to begin with, would Plantings
grant that for

arbitrary free world, it
it?

It looks risky.
(5)

Thus (6)

is

logically possible that God create

Consider

God does A

—>

0(God does A)

God is able to do A

—>

<>(God

is able to do A)

Now if Plantings admits that
(7)

0 (God brings about

w

w)'

for arbitrary w, he must also presumably
admit
(8)

<>(God

for any w whatever.

is

able to bring about

w)'

w

But if (Ad) is false, there must be a

world that is possibly brought about
w

- and

hence such that

it is possible that God is able to bring it about

- but
w

which God is in fact unable to bring about

w

.

Thus if

Plantings wants to maintain the generality of
(7) but in
effect deny (4d), he must admit - indeed demonstrate - that
(9)

(3w)(0(God

is able to bring about
is able to bring about
w

wn

w)

&

ru

(God
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We seem to have a ease in

(

9 ) where no logical law stops

Ood, yet something else does,
even though Sod is omnipotent.
And just to make it all worse,
in order not to fatally
weaken
the defense, the required
demonstration must not be a non-

logical one.

We can also view (9) as

a

claim that for some

worlds, whether or not God
can create them is a purely

contingent matter.
But first things first.

Why admit that for any free

world whatever, it is possible
that God bring about

w

that

world?

The reasons go back to what it
is to create a free

world,

as discussed a moment ago,
there is a raximal seg-

ment of the world in question
which God can strongly actualize,

but developments beyond that
point are out of His hands.

Whatever those developments may be,
the whole process may
then be described as the weak
actualization of that world.

N ° W slnce the subsequent turnings are
beyond God's area of

responsibility, obviously nothing that
God does entails how
those further events go, except in
the uninteresting sense
that one cannot freely climb the
Matterhorn if God placed no

such mountain in the world.

Within those loose logical

parameters, things can go in any direction
whatever.

Thus for

any specific direction, it is logically
possible that God
actualizes the maximal segment and that things
go in that
direction.

Thus it is logically possible that God weakly

ej

actualize the world consisting
of that maximal segment and
that development from it.
For instance, consider a
world
w in which there are free
persons and none

evil.

of them ever do

It is possible that Ood does
all that He can do toward

bringing about „ - actualizes
the maximal segment - and
that
the resultant free persons
never do any evil. Thus it is
possible that Sod bring about

w

that world w.

similar

considerations suffice to show that
for any world, that

possibility holds.

At this point, the complications
begin.

ually

I

f God

some maximal segment T involving
a person

act-

3 who

is

free with respect to one act
A, 3 may subsequently do A, or
S

may subsequently refrain from A.

Both of these event-

ualities are logically possible outgrowths
of exactly the
same maximal segment.

Consider the world in which God

actualizes T and s then freely does
A, and call the world
w.

Let the world in which God actualizes
T and then 3 freely

retrains from A be

w'

.

w and w'

are of course different

worlds, but they share exactly the same
maximal segment - God
does exactly the same thing in creating
either world - and
if de does more than T, the resultant
world is neither w nor
w',

since T is the maximal segment, i.e.,
the absolute

maximum that God can do without curtailing
the freedom of
with respect to

A

.

3

By extrapolation, it can be seen that for
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every possible maximal
segment involving free
persons, there
are a number of distinct
worlds that share that
segment.
two worlds Bhare a
maxinal segment T, and
if T
covers all the things under
God's direct control,
then whatis that differentiates
those two worlds must be
out-

age

Ood's direct (strong)
control - indeed, given the
nature
of maximal segments and
freedom, outside the control
of any
possible omnipotent being.
Given that situation, God
cannot
control which of, say, w or
w' would result
were He to
actualize T. suppose he wished
to bring about w. In
order to
do that, all God could do
would be to actualize
T.
Were He
to do more, whatever
world resulted would not
be w. But so
far, nothing has happened
which would guarantee . over »<
.
In fact, what God does in
attempting to bring about w is
precisely what He would do were He
trying to bring about w'.

Of course, God might know which
world would result from His
doing T, but the point at the
moment is that there is no
special push He could give that
would guarantee the one over
the other*
In any case, it is at least
possible that God does T

and that w results, and it is
also possible that God does T
and that w' results, i.e*,

and

(10)

0 (Ood brings about w

w)

(11)

0 (God

w'

brings about
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Now if (4d)
(

and

12

i0

true,

then

God ia able to bring about

)

w w

God is able to bring about
w
w

(15)

1

but Plantinga is going
to try to show that
either (12) or
(1J) 13 false, thereby .showing (4d)
false.

Suppose that God were to do
T.

That involves God

creating the appropriate
physioal universe, creating
3 , and
putting S in a position to
choose to do A or to refrain,
once
S is

in that situation he
has to either choose
A or choose to

refrain - one or the other.

That being so, it see™ that
it

must be either true or not
true that

(U

Were God to d0 T, S would freely
choose to do A

)

But no natter which truth value
we pick, says Plantinga,
we can then show that there
is a world that God is
not able
to bring about (or could not
have brought about) even weakly.
Is (14) true?

about

w

Then observe what happens if
God tries to bring

fo do

that, as we've seen, God must
do exactly T.

out since (14) is true, doing
T results in S'a choosing A and
the world in which that occurs is
w,

If God tries to do some-

thing other than T, the resultant
world won't be

w'

either,

since God's doing exactly T ia
stipulated as a constituent of
w'.

So all that God can do in order
to create w'

is to do T,

and that, as it turns out, simply
does not work.

But (14) is,

if true, only contingently true.

What if it
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ia

false?

In that case, bringing about
w praaenta a problem.

Again, to create w, 3od
that

3

w.
3
is

roust

actualize I.

If after Sod does

freely chooses A, then the
emergent world will Indeed
But If (1A) is false, it is
just plain not true that

would respond in the manner
desired if a 0d did

T,

i.e., it

not the case that were God to
do T, world w would result.

As before, if God does something
other than T, the ensuing
world is neither w nor

w'

,

eo we again have a case where

there is only one course of action
that Sod can take, and

that one simply does not seem to
work.
So if (14)
to create,

i8

true, there is a world that God
is unable

even though it is logically
possible that that

world be brought about
w

by God.

If (14) is false, again

there is a world that God is unable
to create even though
it is logically possible that that
world be brought about
by God.

w

In the one case the world is w and in
the other w',

but since (14), like any proposition,

can be held to be

either true or false, at least one of
(12) or (1^) must be
false, and so must (Ad).

Thus there are true analogs of (A), but none
of them
can be of any use where free worlds are
concerned.

There are

on the other hand, some that are relevant
to free worlds, but

none of them is true.
To put plantinga

'

s

arguments to this point in perspective.
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w« have not been required
to modify our notion of
omnipotence
beyond ( 5 ), nor have we
been asked to drop claims
of God's
omnipotence. We have merely had
our attention directed
toward the Idea that the
application of the view of omnipotence indicated by
(?) is more perilous than hitherto
supposed , and that perhaps some
atheologians have not accorded
it due respect.

But it was said that Plantings
had a defense, and the
foregoing seems to be merely
the destruction of a (perhaps

hypothetical) atheological argument.

Fair enough, but the

seeds of a defense are there,
and Plantinga is quick to

sprout them.

Notice that all the above
considerations can be generalized and extended to cover
any free worlds sharing a maximal

segment, and any creative omnipotent
being.

We can infer

from that
(15)

For any possible omnipotent being,
there are
worlds which that being is unable to
even weakly
bring about, even though the weak
bringing
about of any of those worlds by that
being is
logically consistent.

Pick any possible omnipotent being
whatever, we cannot
reasonably demand of that being the ability
to create just any

arbitrary world.

It is at least possible that were that
being

to actualize the maximal segment
of the desired world, the free

creatures of that world would freely
proceed in a direction
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engendering a world other than
the target world, but whioh
aharee that world's maximal
segment. Of course, it may
be
that were the maximal segment
set up, the free creatures
would perform as their creator
wished, and the being would
be able to create^ the world
in question.

non-truth of that is

a'

But the truth or

purely contingent matter, and
as

argued in an earlier section, no
omnipotent being can mahe
that aort of contingency true at
will.
The picture we get ia that with
reapect to God (or any

omnipotent being), there ia aome set
of worlda none of which
lie

is

m

fact able to create, although it
ia possible that

He ia able to do so, and under different
circumstances He
would be able to, those different
circumstances being that

m

the various cases the truth values
of the subjunctives

corresponding to (14) have different truth
values than they
in fact have.

But now consider the set of all those
possible worlds

which it is logically possible that God
bring about

which as

a

matter of fact He is not able to.

w

but

Is it logically

possible that every free world devoid of evil (or
perhaps just

every free world better than this one) be within
that set?
Intuitively, it would seem so.
it is a free world,

Every free perfect world, since

is a world that God

can at most weakly

actualize, i.e., for which there is some maximal segment

constituting what God can do to bring about that world.

For
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each auch world to come about,
God must do His part and
then
the free peraona involved
muat do theirs. But with
respect
to each world,

it is possibly the case
that were God to do

the appropriate creating, the
relevant individual would not

uphold their end of the project.

And there aeems no reason

to think that not only for
each world ia that possible,

but

that further it ia possible
that for each free perfect
world
that ia the case.

If it ia, then it ia possible that
every

free world not containing evil
(or every free world superior
to this one) ia among those that
God cannot create.
is so,

If that

then God can be omnipotent,
omniscient, and wholly

good and still create a world
containing evil.

that a successful defense need
establish.

That is all

(At a later point,

an argument for an even stronger
conclusion will be examined -

namely that even if not every free
perfect world were in the
unavailable set, God might still have created
this world
without losing claim to any of the traditional
properties.)
The operative term in the above ia 'establish'.
has

In what

just passed, all that was claimed was that
there seemed to

be no reason to think that the required
eventuality was not

possible.

That, of course, does not establish that it is
a

possibility, but at this point Plantings provides
another

argument, this one designed to do just that - to establish
that
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(

16 )

It is possible that every free
world not
containing evil i 8 among those
that God
though omnipotent, cannot create.

We now have before us the
essence of Plantinga’s
position.

According to (15), omnipotence
does not rule out

inability to create any member
of a certa n set of worlds,
and (16) asserts that there
is no logical bar to that
set

containing every free perfect world,

if the possibility

given by (16) were actual, then
God could not create any

of the free perfect worlds, and thus
the existence of a
world containing evil would not
constitute final proof that

there was no God.

In short, if (16) can be made to stand,

the defense can rest.

The argument for (16) is similar in
structure to

Plantinga's first argument, but is relativized
more to
persons than worlds.

of

a

As was the case with worlds,

person is a two-stage affair.

creation

God is responsible for

the actualization of some things concerning
a person, but the

person must himself determine what things he
will freely choose,
and jod cannot control those choices so long as
they are to be

free

Suppose that God wishes to create perfect world w which
contains possible person 3.

In order to obtain that end result,

God must actualize w's maximal segment, which includes, among

other things, the creation of S, the setting up of the situations
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characteristic of w, and the
piecing of s in those
situations.
God oust then, of course,
leave s free to react to
finding
himself in those situations
in whatever way he freely
chooses.
Sinoe that is the case, it
is at ieast iogically
possible that
were 3 created as part -of the
maxima segment that w stores
with a number of worlds, that
s would freeiy choose to
do some
evil, with the consequence
that the resultant world
would not
be w after all, but some
other of the worlds having the
same
maximal segment.

Now it

is at least possible that
S would react similarly

to the situation within
whioh he found himself were he
created
as part of the maximal
segment possessed by any free
perfect

world whatever.

(If s „ ere auch( he would be
affUcted

a mild strain of what
Plantinga calls

^

'transworld depravity'.)

Were that possibility to turn out
to be realized, then God would
not be able to create any free
perfect world containing s.

The reason parallels what has gone
before - were God to pick
a perfect world containing
s and to try to create it. He would

have to actualize the maximal segment
of that world.

But that

involves setting up the situations of
that world, creating

s,

and leaving s free to react to
being in those situations.

But

by hypothesis, were God to do that,

s would

the desired world would not be
reached.

go wrong, and thus

And again, there is

nothing else that God can do without
causing s to cease being
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free.

If O od does anything other
than the epecified segment,
some entirely different
world would result,
so the one thing
that Ood has to do to
yield the target world
fails - God is
not able to create that
world, since the argument
is

perfectly general, God cannot
then create any free
perfect
world containing s. More
generally, ood cannot create
any
perfect world containing any
person who suffers transworld
depravity*
Finally, says Plantings, it

is

logically possible that

every free possible person
suffers this subjunctive malady.
Given that, Ood cannot create
any free perfect possible
world at all, even though
He is omnipotent, omniscient,
and

Wholly good.

In short, if the arguments are
good, Plantings

has constructed a workable
defense.

That completes the somewhat
informal introduction to
Plant mga

'

a

free will defense.

To recapitulate, Plantings

points out that the most that
we can dermnd of any omnipotent

being, for instance God,

i8

that He be able to bring about

anything which is consistent with
its being brought about by
Him* But there are some things
which for logical reasons can
be brought about, if at all,
only through uncompelled

cooperation of other beings, and if
those beings are not
willing, the desired outcome is simply
not available.

non-cooperation is possible, so is non-creatability.

Since

No possible
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omnipotent being can ereate
arbitrary free worlds on
demand,
so that inability
does not count against
omnipotence. Further,
there are no interesting
restrictions on the makeup
of the set’
Of worlds not creatable
by any particular
possible

extent

being, thus it is
possible that every perfect
world is one of
those on which, given
the opportunity, the
other depended-

upon beings would refuse
to cooperate.

Were that possibility
realized, no omnipotent
being faced with such
stubbornness
oould create a free
non-evil world. Thus the
existence of
evil is without serious
logical ramification for
the theist.
Siven now a grasp of the
intuitions involved, we can
take

a

somewhat closer look at
Plantinga's arguments.

First,

the argument for
(15).

Since the argument ia completely
general, in order to
aid us in keeping track
of what is ultimately at issue,
we

will choose Sod as our
arbitrary omnipotent being.

We will
let „ be a world containing
some agent who is free with
respect
to some action A
and who does the act.
,
We will let w' be a
world sharing a maximal segment
- T - with w, but in
which the
act ia not committed. Thus
(17)

*

(T

*A)&^(T—^~A)

Def of T and A

Finally, let 'GP' stand for
'God strongly actualizes

P'

The argument will essentially be
this:
(18)

(GT >

A) v

(GT >

A)

>
(where
is the
subjunctive connective)
1

'
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(1

(ST

>

A

)

~(GT

>

A

)

')

(20)

—^ Sod

13 not able to
actualize „•

9>0od la not able to
actualize w

cf courae, if either
consequent

is true, then there
will
be some world or other
that God is not able
to actualize,
but both W and
are .worlds which are
logically possibly the
results of God s creating.

W

1

Therefore
(

21 )

(

3»)(

(Sod brings about
w) & Sod is not abl,
to bring about
w)

The crucial steps, of
course, are found within
the
arguments for (19) and
(20). Planting^ presentation
of
hia argument for
(19) runs as follows (my numbering):

[if
(22)

GT

>

A

thenj it is easy to see
that God could not have
actualized this world w .
1

For suppose He could have,
Then there is a state
of affairs o' such that God
could have strongly
actualized O' and such that if
He had, w' would be
actual. That is
(25)

But

GO' >
w'

(24)

How w

w'

includes GT;
GC'

>

so

GT

either includes or precludes
GO';
if the
latter, uC' precludes w . But in view
of (2 2>)
GO' does not preclude w' unless,
contrary to' our
hypothesis, GO' is impossible. So w
includes GO'.
T, furthermore, is the largest
state of affairs
God actualizes in w';
T, therefore, includes O'
1

1

1
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n

UdeS aG '*

GTV--'
G

iH

G?>

“enoe;

A.

(25)

HSnCe the 8tate of affairs
t0 GT ‘ By (22)
f

-

8

& GT)

(GO'

>

A

But from (2 4) and
(25) it follows that
(26)

GO'.)

But A precludes

GC

(27)

>

A
w*

and hence includes w'

;

so

w»

25 ) and ( 27 ), however, are
both true only if go’
impossible, in which case God
could no( have
Accordin Sly, there is no state
of
affaii^n?
8 0
s ch that God
could have strongly
^
8uch that if He had
(

is

.

,

“

As shown in Appendix I,

the derivation oan be laid
out

formally correctly, without
too much trouble.

concession that Planting needs

is the

The only

following plausible-

looking principle:
(2b)

(s)(God can actualize*
actualize C & (GO
s

s

>

<-* (3 0)(God can
s))

The argument for (20) shares the
spirit of that for
(19),
but is a bit more complex.
It is
22

false, then God could not have
)
f^ (
actualized w. For suppose He could
have;
then
(as before) there would
be a state of affairs 0
auch that God could have
strongly actualized 0
and such that, if He had, w
would have been
actual. That is
(29)

GO >

w

Now if (29) is true, then so is
either
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(50)

(GO & GT) >

W

(GO & GT) >

W

or
(51)

ara

rr

Be lf t22) ia " in0lUd ° 3
3 0 (unless nj' l8
os i
e
in which
h case, eontrnru
contrary
to the assumption. God enniH
+ t
^° Q cou l° n °t
have actualized itV
but t
Q iu

L

i

-i

v:?r^vi::T
an

rs aod
OT includes GO. If so,
*
eqU1VQlent t0 3T. And since
(??)
iVfalst
raise, the same goes
'
'
for (JO).

e

however

?

•

And now consider Ml'). i?uu„. nrt
includes GT or it
does not.
Suppose it
WG
h&VQ 8eon » if G0
is possible and (?Q
8 T'
^ rue * ^h® 0 w
includes GO;
but T includes
iririuH
n
so GT includes
0;
GO.
So if an
e8
30 "* GT ar ° ^-alentl
But
22
ie fa^
8 ° 18
(29) if GC deludes GT.
So 00
0. does
dofa not include ST;
hence GO & GT is a
possible state of affairs.
But w includes G'f
r ltlGiude8
hence 00
GT includes i;
hen oe ?(since GO & GT is
possible) (Jl) i 8 false.

1

*

.

,

,

i

^ T?
•

H

.

«So

As is the case in the
previous argument, we must
grant
Plantings (28). Given that,
the derivation seems to
proceed
smoothly, and is fully laid
out in Appendix II. plantings
continues
13 eith3r true or *«•..
And
iiU’
wither way, there are poaaible
worlds including
His existence that Sod
could not have actualized.
are P° 3 b
»«lds including His existence
?hat rod
that
God could not have actualized.

“

T1

18

la8t

18 raerel
y

^

Plantings

's

way of stating (15) - that

any omnipotent being (e.g.,
God) there are worlds which
that being ia unable to bring
about (weakly) even though the

weak bringing about of that
world by that being is logicaiiy
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consistent.

If the above arguments are
acceptable, then Plantings
has indeed gone a long
way toward achieving hia
aim of

demonstrating the viability of
the defense, leaving him
only the task: of showing
that it is possible that
every
free flawless world is one
of those within the unavailable

set o

In order to do that, Plantinga
introduces the notion of

transworld depravity (TWD) defined
as follows:
person P suffers TWD if and only
if for every
worid w such that P is
significantly free in w
and P does only what is
right in w, there is a
state of affairs T and an
action A such that

A

(1)

God strongly actualizes
T in w and

1

includes every state of affairs
God
strongly actualizes in w

and

(2)

A is morally significant for
P in w

(5)

If God had strongly actualized
T, P
would have gone wrong with respect

•

then goes on
What is important about the idea
of transworld
depravity is that if a person suffers
from it, then
it was not within God s power
to actualize any
world in which that person is
significantly free
but does no wrong
But clearly, it is
possible that everybody suffers from
transworld
depravity. If this possibility were
actual, then
God could not have created any of
the possible
worlds that included the existence and
freedom of
just the persons who do in fact exist,
and also
contain moral good but no moral evil.
1

....

(In response to the suggestion that
God create other

people, Plantinga modifies the above
definition slightly to
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it applicable to all
possible people, then makes
dales
similar to that just quoted.
For simplicity, I shall
stick
tc the stated definition.)

The ar S ument that if a
person 3 suffers TWO then
God
cannot actualize any free
flawless world containing
s in a
significantly free state follows
closely some of the lines

already laid down, and is given
in full in Appendix

HI.

Again, the major components
of the argument are the
relevant
definitions and principle
(28).

Now that we have in hand both
the intuitions and the
formal arguments, what can
be said about them?

volume of literature called forth
much.

is

if the

any indication, not

There are, to date, not enough
articles to strain

a one-handed

tabulator - in fact, there are
just three, one

of wmch [J]

is addressed to points that
are not of present

concern.

None of the articles takes serious
issue with formal
aspects of Plantinga's arguments,
but both William j. Wainwright
[4] and

Peter Y. Windt

[ 5]

evince some degree of suspicion

over tne state in which Flantinga
leaves our view of God's

omnipotence.

Wainwright ultimately decides that there
are no

unanswerable objections, but Windt is not
inclined to be quite
so charitable.
It is perhaps not surprising that th ere
should be unease.
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since it no doubt would seem
odd to many that an
omnipotent
being like 3od should be
unable to create certain
worlds
even though for any one
of those worlds there is
no logical
reason for the non-creatability
of it, or, as Wainwright
puts it, that there should
be
k nd 0f ana ke which
S
is independent of
w
does not determine the
limiting facts)
and which may prevent od
Q
from freely realizing
°
ni8 desires.
port
aod

/Vt
(sod

Of course, oddity per se

is not fatal to

philosophical

positions, but Windt believes
that at least in part the

oddity arises because of an
inconsistency in the defense.

He sa ye
Plantinga has claimed that God can
be said to be
omnipotent if and only if He can
create any state
o
affairs, 3 , such that 'God creates
S' is consistent. But the force of the argument
under
discussion is to show that, although
'God creates
only morally perfect persons' is
consistent,
circumstances might arise in which it
would be
impossible for God to create only morally
perfect
persons.
The reply, which has been anticipated
within the preceeding
pages, is that two senses of 'create'
have been conflated.

Plantinga does indeed subscribe to the
principle of omnipotence
alluded to when the antecedent 'create'
is 'create
(4a) and

(4b).

'

3

- see

His arguments show that the principle with
an

antecedent 'create
w

'

is false - see (4c) and

(4d).

When Windt

says that 'God creates only morally
perfect persons'

is con-

sistent, he is correct only if that is read
'creates

'.

But in
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order to generate a
problem employing that
claim either (4 c
)
or (Ad) must be appealed
to, and they have
both been shown
false - Indeed, that
can be viewed as the
whole purpose of
Plantings' s first arguments.
The charge of internal
inconsistency, therefore, does
not seem well-founded.
»

But Windt also objects
to the defense on
other grounds
For instance
*’

lantin Sa

argument to succeed in
Hy necessary that
~od creates
uod
cr a t
morally perfect persons' is
cont,
ngent, then his argument
has the effect of
showing that an omnipotent
being is lugicaiiy
logically
impossible.
d

t

I

11

'

s

lo S lca

do not actually think
that that is an accurate
con-

strual of Plantings

a

aim, but even if it were,
we would

not need to live with the
result that Windt extracts
from it.
suppose that we agreed that
any omnipotent being was
necessarily able to generate
morally perfect persons on
demand, and
that Plantinga had just shown
us that we oould net demand
that
Of any being - that any being
who could fill the demand
could
do so only contingently.
We could either drop claims that

omnipotence was possible, or we
could simply concede that
we
had not fully grasped our
own demand, and then quit
demanding
It,

just as we no longer require
that Sod be able to produce

square circles,

of Plantinga

'

a

windt is here simply proposing
that in light
arguments we give up trying to
apply the term

101

1

omnipotent'

It is not necesaary
to consider that
theistically

damaging.
But is there, despite the
failure of specific criticises,
an unacceptable general
feature of Plantings'
s position?
Is
Vindt right when he says
•
P^ntinga'a argument, if correct,
*
actually
;
esta
liahea that what God can
create is partially
f0rtune » tb «t] this notion
of
*
diTin
r
me fortune
is not compatible with
any satis-

factory notion of divine
omnipotence.

Vain wright agrees that things
look bleak:

,

V

*
W Uld appear that
God can do is
?
partially determined
by a set of contingent
tacts. .
this might appear to be incompatible with God's omnipotence.

^

.

but tends toward the view that
only the appearance of

bleakness is involved.

He notices that the situations over

win ch God does not have direct
control are those involving

free will, where control is ruled
out for conceptual reasons.

But of course, nothing in Plantinga's
arguments or conclusions
prohibits God from being able to bring
about strongly anything
for which it is logically possible
that He do so - indeed.

Plantinga insists upon it in the form
of (4a) - and that is
perhaps all that it is reasonable to
hold out for.

Further,

any possible omnipotent being will
be under the sort of
contingent limitation now under discussion.
case,

That being the

it is no indication of non-omnipotence
that God also
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operate under that aort
of limitation,

of course, as Wain-

wright says

^

'

beU^rablff^
result xn accordance with
Hia desires
aesires, hut
but it is not clear that
a
wmch created a sinless world
(of
free
persons'!
wnen placed in these
circumstances would deserve
to be called -more
skilled' or -stronger*
or

beW

p rftoriBi “S
ifficuu'taskf ItT'ztlt 81mply
J
m ° re
favorably

a 'mo re d

situated.

But Windt will not accept
-simply more favorably situated- as telling the
whole story.

WbUe

He replies

it is true that Sod
would

remain as powerful
be * 3 neW dimensi °n of
comparative
eva? a +
n ° f deUieS C ° Uld n °
W be introduced!
Other bei §S aS W18e> ° od
and P 0W erfUl as God
s
’
I!
though subject
to the same limitation,
still mi^ht
have produced a better world,
had they been only
rt nate in thS Choices
available to them!
Pllnti°
Plantinga's
argument, if it is correct,
establishes
S
d S
Ult that we have *°ral evil.
?°
ut
8 30
3h ° win o that God, although
doing
t 8 t°u
G
'^ ld with the options available to
Him y 8 ee
fortunate than possible. And
:
+H
u
thlnk
13 not compatible with
®, T
>
I
traditional
ways of talking about
God's omnipotence.

ny

einS

C ° Uld

^

<

U

^

Of course, Windt'

s

'

remarks here amount to a
concession

that Plantings has succeeded
in what he set out to do he
has shown that the
existence of an omnipotent,
omniscient,

good being is logically
compatable with the existence of
evil

^

1
.

0t 8eem quite clear what is
issue here. Windt
?° d Can be a9 S ° 0d as i°gically possible, as
nnw er
as
P
ogically possible, and presumably
as knowing as
logicaiiy possible, yet he is still
unsatisfied with
defense. A clue as to why may be
provided in Windt's frequent
?

1+
-

^

.

i

PlantWs

loj

conjunction of terms like 'divine
Ui
fortune'
6 ora 18c;Lence
God's omnipotence', and his
?
suggestion that
that
w e are not
making
all the right comparisons.
•

^
ZiTiT^

that althou * h
P lant inga 'd ef end s fbeing
T*
and
y good
o
e
le belng3 that ° ne might
P SS
rather have been created
bv or h
lancing ITs'tZ Ullulle

Tn

S^nf^

“

WlndVs •»?•«»«*

a”’"'

r

Of Mivinii;r tn2n pertape
„ha?
e means is that bad fortune
does not agree with divinity.

[Us criticisms, then, might be
that although Plantinaa
has shown that omnipotence,
omnieci«ce, omnibenevoience fad
bad luck are compatible
with evil, he tas not therefore
tible " Uh eVll > and that that
ls
the
uhe candle for
fo^“h*Vjv,°°T
which the theist must ultimately
play.
0” U
h6r Wlndt 13 ri ht or not
S
have to
wait until we get
I a “f
clearer notion of divinity. In
anv
case
nothing that. he says shows that
Plantinga has lost the” battle
riglnally ^° lned ” a Sainst the historical
argument
from evii

unUlT^

'
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chapter
Although none of the

IV

f„ regolng is

evldently deol8ive
againat Plantings, there
is perhaps more
to he said.
pUntinga'a
position and arguments
rely heavily upon
certain uses of
subjunctive conditional's
and possible worlds,
and before
attempting further evaluation
of his defense we should
have
in hand an understanding
of just how it is that
subjunctives
and worlds have come
to be linked.

subjunctives have traditionally
been a philosophical
fogbank, but in recent
years some of the mist has
been dispelled as a result of the work
of Robert stalnaker
[8] and
David lewis [5J
who have given a number
,
of distinct
(although closely related)
possible world semantics for
subjunctives.

Plantings opts for

a

Stalnaker-style

semantics, a skeletal version
of which follows.
Let us assume that we can
rank possible worlds in
order
Of similarity (in various
respects determined pragmatically)
to any specific base
world. Given an ordering
and a base
world, a subjunctive is true
in that base world just
in case
if in the world nearest
the base world in which the
antecedent

of the subjunctive

is true,

the consequent of the subjunctive

is also.

A variety of variations on
this theme is possible and,

according to the intuitions of
some, desirable.

For instance,
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We

°“

all °” UOrldS t0 tle in

world or not.

-*r.. of similarity

to the base

It does seem plausible
that a number of dis-

tinct worlds might be equally
similar, on some criterion,
to
some base world, and if that
is the case, since
none of the
equally similar worlds' would
seem to have greater claim
to

relevance in determining the
truth value of the subjunctive,
the reasonable thing might
be to consider them all,
and

assign the subjunctive 'true'
only if in all the relevant
equally similar worlds the
consequent of the subjunctive
were true.
It has also been thought that
this suggestion of

allowing ties should apply to the
base.

The reason is that

if the antecedent of the
subjunctive in question is true in
the base world, then the base
world itself is the nearest such
world, so the subjunctive is assigned

'true'

just in case

the consequent is also true in
the base world.

This

generates what might be called 'the
TT problem'

-

that any

two true propositions whatever
will, regardless of whether

or not there is the remotest
connection between them, be
the antecedent and consequent of a
true subjunctive.

By

allowing other worlds to tie the base
world in similarity to
itself in the relevant respects then granting
'true' under
the conditions specified before, that
sort of result can be

avoid ed

•

107

Of course, worlds can, like
anything else, be -ore or
less similar in various
respects, and by emphasizing
different respects in generating
similarity orderings, we can

produce different orderings
within any group of worlds.
When we generate an ordering
for purposes of evaluating
some subjunctive, we look
for worlds which are like
the
base world in the desired
respects and in which the
antecedent of the subjunctive is
true, what we ulti, lately
try
bo gauge, in terms of
the truth value of the
consequent.
Is the impact

of the truth of the antecedent
on a situation

held constant in the relevant
respects.

Obviously, if we do not know
what the relevant respects
are, evaluation of a subjunctive
becomes a fruitless

project.

For example, suppose Jones
is somewhat of a bird

fancier, and all winter has kept
a well stocked bird feeder

which has been visited almost
exclusively by chickadees.
Chickadees being dainty eaters,
the project has been inexpensive.

Starlings, on the other hand, have
notoriously

large appetites and thus we
might think that
(1)

,Vere a

Jones'

flock of starlings to begin frequenting
feeder, his feed bill would rise

But on the other hand, Jones, being
an average sort of
bird fan, has a deep loathing
of starlings, so if his feeder

began attracting starlings his
feed bill would drop to nothing

since he'd rather have no feeder
at all than be running a
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8

ta r 1 ing hangou t

Thus, evaluation of
(1) hlnge8 on what faotora

constant.

^

^

If we hold constant Jones'
hitherto followed

policy of keeping the feeder
filled, (1) seems true.

If „e
hold constant his antipathy
for starlings,
(1) seems false.

Without some idea of what

is

being held constant, there
is

no point in trying to
evaluate (1).

We oa „ know what the

semantics for (1) will look like,
but we eventually have
to have an ordering, and
the semantics does not
provide
that - that is something to
be determined pragmatically.
In other words, subjunctives are
pragmaticall y ambiguous
In view of the above, it
might appear that evaluating

Flantinga

defense will be problematic,
since the defense

involves statements like
(2)

/Jere God

to do T,

would result

w'

and yet we do not seem to have
been given much indication of
what the pragmatic considerations
are. Thus we may not be able
to evaluate
(2),
d

and

if „ e can't, how can we evaluate
the

efense ?

But remember that Plantings'
two claims,

a

defenae esaentially involves

(i) that there ia a logical
connection between

the truth value of certain
subjunctives and what a particular

being can or cannot bring about (Plantings'

s

version of this

connection is embodied in Chapter
III sentence (28)); and (ii)
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that relative to God's
ability to bring about
a free perfect
world , the relevant
subjunctives my have exactly
the wrong

(from God's viewpoint)
truth value.

But if Plantinga's

arguments are correct,
then if, for instance,
it true,
( 2 )
then God cannot create
a perfect T-world, so
if (2) is merely
le,

then it is possible that
God cannot create that
perfect world, and for
purposes of a defense,
possibility is
all that is needed*

m

View of that, it might
be tempting to reply
that all
that is needed is the
possibility that 2 is true,
(
and that
)
certainly judge

(

2

)

Without further agonising.

as to mere logical
possibility

But this suggestion runs
into the

immediate difficulty that
it makes no more sense
than would a
claim that it is possibly
true that
^5)

He is identical to Jones

(5) expresses different propositions
depending upon the

purely pragmatic consideration
of what he is involved,
the pragmatics, we can say
what a semantics for

like - just as we oouid for

(

2)

(

without

5 ) will loom

- but we can go no
farther.

Perhaps we can, however, push
on a bit with (2).
There
are some statements evaluation
of which involves pragmatic
considerations but which, nevertheless,
we can judge to be true
no matter what the pragmatic
part turns out to be.

W

It is self-identical

For instance

no

damanda apaotfication of
what 'it- rafara to bafora
a full
traatmant can be given, but
despite that, we aan be
aura
that whatever it turns
out to be, (A) will express
a true
proposition. Perhaps similarly
it might be the ease
that
For all orderings
0, (2) is possibly true on
0
We can simplify a bit more.
Any subjunctive with
respect to a specific ordering
and specified base world
is,
if true at that world on
that ordering, necessarily
true
at that world on that ordering,
and if false, necessarily
(5)

so.

Thus (5) comes to
(

6)

For all orderings 0,
(2) is true on 0

If the claim that
(2) is possibly true just comes to
(7)
(6), then that claim is simply false,
and the response to the

original objection fails.
Perhaps, though, we need not
settle on so drastic an

interpretation of the claim.

More plausible is the inter-

pretation of it as

There is an ordering 0 such that
(2) is true on 0
(/) seems absolutely true.

For instance,

in the actual

world (hereinafter •*•), wrongful
acts are performed, and in
w'

it is also true that wrongful
acts - e.g., A - are per

formed, while in w none are.

Thus on a similarity ordering

based on whether or not wrongful
acts are performed,

obviously nearer

o<

w'

is

than is w, and thus
(2) can come out true.

Ill

Thus if Plantinga needs
only the

that just means

(

7 ),

poa8lbuUy of

(a)j

^

,

f

then the repiy seems
initialiy successfUi

However, plantings himself
may rule out that response
in [7] in his discussion
of the notion of ordering.

He begins

that discussion saying
xhe required notion of
similarity is in many
respects problematic, what
does it mean to say
that one possible world
is more similar
than another? In this
context is there such a
thing as similarity uberhaupt,
or should we
speak only of similarity in
given respects?

to/

He then states that he has 'no
time to linger* over that
question and without explicitly
giving an answer, proceeds
with his discussion. It seems
clear, however, that

Plantings thinks that there are
restrictions that must be
placed on orderings, and that
not all orderings are

admissible for specific purposes.

My reasons for attributing

that general view to Plantinga
come out of the following:

Now suppose we consider
[(8)]

If Robbins had slipped and fallen at
Thanksgiving Ledge, he would have been
killed

No doubt, we are inclined to accept
this proposition.
But should we? In the actual world
Robbins did not
tall at Thanksgiving Ledge;
instead he nimbly climbed
on to it and spent a comfortable
night. Now what
happens in the closest world in which he
falls? Well
there is at least one of these - call
it W' - in
winch he falls at t just as he is
reaching the Ledge;
at the next moment t + 1 (as close
as you please to t)
he shows up exactly where he was in °< at
t+1; and
everything else goes just as it does in
.
Would W*
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not be more similar to
the actual world than anv
in which he hurtles down
to the valley floor
thus
depriving American rock
climbing of iL retell
most
eio
quent spokesman? And if
u ° Uld
u Ue not rate
’
[(S)] false?

Plantinga continues
The answer,. of course, is
that we are neglecting
° Ur W ° rld COnta ^ns a
bei^of
y are aia0ns it3 mo3t
coLtft
+
stituents
... An d once we note thftt impressive
thege
laws do not hold in W
*, so the claim goes, we shall
no longer be tempted to thin*
it very
r t0
Y similar
to °<
o<
where they do hold.

Plantinga is not entirely happy
with that reply, for
reasons not at issue at the moment,
but as to present appli-

cation he says that *no doubt
there is truth in this reply'

Plantinga seems to be saying here
is that for pur-

f/hat

poses of the Robbins case, even
though there are orderings

on which (8) is false, these
orderings are somehow irrelevant.

There seems to be a distinction
being made between orderings

admissible and those inadmissible for
that purpose, and

although the criteria are not spelled
out, one of them seems
to be whether or not various

abandoned

'impressive constituents' are

.

Presumably, Plantinga will agree that we
are faced with

exactly the same sort of situation when we
discuss what an
agent can or cannot do.

It is,

first of all, clear that the

truth values of certain subjunctives are
involved in deter-

minations of what someone can or can't weakly
bring about.
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For Instance,

I

can bring it about as
a matter of fact,
that

my study lamp is on,
because

I

can flip the switch
and it is

true in acme relevant
respect that
(9)

Here

I

to flip the switch,

the lamp would come on
and it makes no difference
whatever to my ability that
on

infinitely many orderings,
that subjunctive is false.
orderings, somehow, do not
count for this purpose.

Those

Similarly, if my lamp is
defective in some way, my
ability to turn the lamp
on by flipping the switch
is lost,
even though there are
still, in that situation,
infinitely
many orderings on which
(9) is true,
somehow, none of those
order ings count.

The point here ia that although
subjunctives like (2)
are crucial to what God can
or cannot do, not just any

random ordering will support
auch an ability statement.
Thus, demonstration that
(2) is true on some ordering or

other, or false on some ordering
or other does not establish

anything at all about what God
can or cannot achieve.

The

issue must at this point be
narrowed to whether or not
(10)

There is an ordering 0 such that
0 is an
admissible ordering and
(2) is true on 0

(One more slight modification
will come later, but
(10) will serve for the moment.)

Again, we do not yet know what

'

admissible' really comes to.
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but we do too, that there
must be such a distinction,
and
that admissible orderings
are those which are
capable of
supporting ability or lack
of ability statements.
,

of course,

open to the atheologian
to sit back

and

challenge Plantings to
establish (10), but the eager
atheologian might go a bit
further. He might, for
instance,
note that w and w> share
T and that T is naximal,
and claim
that any further feature
outside T that was used as
a basis
for an ordering would,
given T's maxiaality, entail
that s
did A, or entail that
S did not do A.
Thus, basing an

ordering on anything not contained
in T amounts to picking
an ordering based on Ss action based, in effect, on the

consequent of the conditional.

But that sort of ordering,

the atheologian might say, is
not an admissible ordering.

In fact, in the Robbins case.
Plantings himself rejected

such an ordering.

tnmg

And if the ordering is based upon
some-

internal to T, no ordering of w
and w

since both of them comtain
T.

'

results at all,

Thus there is no relevant

respect in which it can be allowed
tha

c

w and

w

1

differ,

and thus (2) is not true and
hence (10) is false.

Plantings is aware that a fight might
develop over

something like this issue, ao he attempts
to spike the
opposition guns by arguing that an objection
like the fore-

going must ultimately be based upon a
common misconception
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concerning ordering.

In fact, he thinks that
the

^con-

ception is serious enough
to threaten the whole
current
notion of possible world
semantics for subjunctives.
Plantings' s uneasiness grows
out of his belief that
it is
generally overlooked that
'one measure of similarity
between worlds is whether
or not they share their
counterfactuals
He thinks that subjunctives
cannot be bypassed
in considerations of
closeness since, he believes,
the

relation between subjunctives
and laws is such that
differences in one entail differences
in the other, and differences
in laws are generally
admitted to be relevant to
determinations

of similarity.

Although he does not confess
himself ready

to junk the popular sorts
of world analyses as viciously

circular or uninteresting, it
does, he says
f
l0W
iat WS Cann0t aa a rule
°^
diacover the
^ a counterfactual
truth value of
by asking whether
its consequent holds in
those worlds most similar
to the actual in which the
antecedent holds, for
e
eatU " e determinin similarity
of worlds is
S
°h
+ 5
whether
they share their co unter factuals

This comes in Plantinga's
defense of the claim that in

general either
(

or

n

)

(12)

A

>

A >

B

~

B

Although this issue is

a

bit removed from the objection

we are considering, Plantinga's
remarks, as will be seen shortly.

are relevant.
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Suppose we let
(A

4

*

B) world, and w’

be the (non-*) base world,
„ be an
be an

(U» B

world.

Let T be the
initial segment shared by the
worlds up to the point where
they diverge. A common sort
of objection to the claim
that
either (11) or (12) is -true
can be stated (as Plantinga
)

reports it) thus:
There are worlds w and w' that
share [t]
these
worlds therefore are equally
similar to « in the
reievant respects. Accordingly,
neither [(11)1
2 ^ is 3Uch
it-s consequent is true
in
^
the closest
world to * in which its
antecedent is;
hence, neither [(H)] nor
[(12)] is true.
:

^

That is, of course, more or
less of a restricted version

of the objection currently under
discussion.

Plantings'

s

reply:

fi orr, the fact that w
and w' share the initial
segment, it does not follow that
they are equally
similar to °< . Suppose [(H)] i 8
true;
then w<“
does not share that count er
factual with
and is
to that extent less similar
to it than w.

The reply does not seem decisive.
w is nearer

(15)

<x than w' is or vice
versa
either (11) or (12) is true

(in general, oi course,

(1J) would not be true.

example, (11) might be true in virtue of
A

world to

tied

Both sides agree that

°c

,

w"

iff

For

being the nearest

and B being true in it, while w and w'
were

further away from

.

However, the cases in which we are

interested are those in which the antecedent is
a maximal

segment shared by (for simplicity) two worlds,
is

acceptable.)

(liven that,

(1J)

H7

Both sides also agree that
(I*)

w and w

share T

1

The objector claims that
(15)

w and w'

share T

-

is nearer o< than
ia, or vice versa)

P lantinga replies

16 )

(A

>

3)

(17)

(A

>

B

(

(18)

>

(A

Since w and

<*

)

B

)

Assume

—
—

and w share the
subjunctive (A >

~

(

and w'

share the subjunctive

share a subjunctive not
held by

according to Plantings, that
is
(19)

<*

w is nearer

o<

a

than

B)

and since

nearness^ietermining factor
w'

is

(Remarks similar to those
following (1J) are appropriate
here too.)

Hence

(20)

(

20 )

(A

>

B)

—>

w is nearer c*

than w' is

It is hard to see what, if
anything, that argument proves.
(19) would be powerful if standing
alone, but it is inside the

scope of an assumption (16) - and thus can do no damage.
,

on the other hand, is free
standing, but does not touch

the objection, and the
objector might will embrace it.

Of course, if plantings could
get (19) alone, the objection
would be shown mistaken.

He might get something like that by

showing by similar argument that
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(

21

,

(A >

/NJ

B)

w'

is nearer or than
w is

then by pointing out
that the consequents
of both (20) and
(21) imply that one of the
worlds is nearer than
the other,
and by setting up a
dilem™, and discharging
it using
(

22

)

(A >

B)

V

(A >

ro

B)

Unfortunately, that would
not aeem legitimate,
since
the debate is over
whether or not subjunctives
lihe the two
in (22) are true
on an admissible
ordering. Andf incidently,
the context within
which Plantings presents
the above argument
of trying to demonstrate
the truth of
(22). Using it
would not be legitimate.

But suppose that a dilemma
based upon (20),
(21), and
(22) is not what Plantings has
in
mind at all.

gun,

whatever he was up to
evidently involved
(17) and (18),
and they seem open to
question. For instance,
it is presupposed in (17) that
(a > B) is true in w.
Although no
explicit reason is given,
we are evidently supposed
to believe
that on the grounds that
A and B are both true in w.
But
that is a good reason
only if the earlier discussed
TT sort
of case does indeed yield
truth - i.e., only if
non-counter
factual subjunctives are
indistinguishable from material
conditionals - and that position
is at the very least not

universally subscribed.
It seems, then, that one
response that we might expect
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Plantmga to give

to the objection
that „ and

the, share T, be e
q uidistant from

*

0„

must, since

an, admissibie

ordering, will not work..

however, it is not entirely
clear that Plantings
is as
adly in need of a response
as he seems to think.
One
reason, which win be
discussed later>
tf
a theologian is right
on this point, some
easy free will
defenses can be based
upon it. Secondly, it
need not be
eonceeded that the
equidistance from the base
world of „
and „ implies that
(22) is false, since there
have been
offered semantics within
which that implication
does not
hold, one semantics
which does just that by
employing

^

^valuations,

^

^

has been discussed by
David Lewis 5
[ ] (p . 81)

Lewis' suggestion can
be slightly modified
to fit into a

Stalnaker-type model in the
following way:

suppose that we

aluating some formula on
some ordering, and that
we
are looking for the P-„orld
nearest the base world. As

it
happens, there is a tie
among a number of p-worlds
for nearest.
Siven that tie, we could
construct a number of artificial

orderings parasitic on the
given ordering in that they
mirrored
the original ordering up
to the tie worlds, then
ordered the
tie worlds in the various
logically possible ways. Thus
if
there were three P-worlds
tied for nearest on the
original
ordering, we could produce six
of these second generation

.
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orderings.

It i. here that the
supervaluations con* in.

In
this system we grant
the formula the truth
value 'true' on
the original ordering
only if that formula
comes out true in
the usual way on each
of the secondary orderings.
In the case of
(22) that would work as follows.

Let

us assume that w and „'
are the only relevant
worlds and
that, as the atheologian
would have it, they are
tied in

similarity to

on the admissible ordering.

We can now
construct two second generation
orderings having no ties.
Both reflect the admissible
ordering up to the tie, then
one of them places w ahead
of w', while the other places
bef° re W- 0n the flr8t
(A >
B) is true, and thus by
addition so is (22). Qn the
secorai,

and again by addition, so
is (22).
botr.

(A >

~

B ) is true,

3in ce (22) is true on

orderings, it is then true on
the original ordering.

Notice, however, that (A
ordering, nor is (A

>

~

B) is not true on the original

>

B

) *

Still, the semantics provides

a way for allowing the tie the
atheologian is pushing, while

allowing Plantings to hang on to
(22).

Thus, if this is an

acceptable semantics. Plantings need
merely adopt it and deny
the opponents claim that the
asserted tie robs him of (22).

However, Plantinga makes some
remarks which seem to

indicate that he would not be willing
to buy (22) at the cost

of giving up both disjuncts individually,
as the above method
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would require.

In discussing whether a
specific agent would
have accepted a bribe
given the chance,
Plantinga says
.
.
there is something [he]
would have done, had
that state of affairs
obtained
•

We can all agree that had
it obtained, the agent
would
have done something or
other, but Planting. says
that there
is some response
R such that had the situation
obtained, R
would have been the agent's
response. In an attempt to
convince us that there is
some such response R, Plantinga
asks:
would an omniscient being
know what the agent would
have done? and answers his
own question 'yes'. If it
is
known what he would have done,
there is, of course, some
thing he would have done.
That is tantamount to claiming
that
at least one of the disjuncts
of the relevant (22)-type

disjunct is true.
But it is not obvious that
Plantinga is right in his

specific claim.

It is surely the case that

Had A been the case, God would
have known the result
it does not follow from that
plus God's omniscience that

God knows what would have been
the result had A been the case.

Granted, an omniscient being knows
all the facts of the matter
and, under different circumstances,
would have known all the
facts - and there would have been
such - of that matter.

have as yet no reason for thinking. since
OJ

A

is

But we

not the case now.
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that there are here and
now facts of the matter
concerning
facts of what would have
been the matter. But if
there are
none such, then not even
an omniscient being will
Know -

there are simply „ 0 relevant
true propositions to Know.
Consider a case wherein
(2-4)

and

^

(25)

(A

>

(A

>

B)

^

3)

how consider the nearest A
-world.
going to be the case there, and
Sod
in that world,

(2^)

,

is

not

being prescient, would,

know which, i.e.,

Were A the case, God would Know
what was going
to happen relative to 8

Suppose that A is not the case.
A

Either B is or

God can know that had

happened either B or not-B would
have, but He cannot know

WhlGh ,
is,

f° r

if He did

^ow

that, say, 3 would have, then
(24)

contrary to the assumption, false.

not-B and (25).

The same goes for

So unless A is actually going to
obtain or

already does (allowing God to know
regarding

3

by virtue of

foreknowledge alone) there is simply
nothing for God to know.
Thus if (24) and (25) are true, it
is not the case that God

or anyone else knows what would have
happened.

Plantinga, of course, wants to maintain
that God does
know,

if so, then either (24) or
(25) is false, but (24)

and (25) are not shown incompatible unless
it is established

that necessarily God knows what would have
happened,

perhaps
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Plantings holds that,
but it is not clear
that he does, and
he does not argue
for it.
far,

the difficulty over
Plantinga'e subjunctives
has
involved only the fact
that the antecedents
are maximal, and
that that may raise
problems concerning their
truth-values.
But the subjunctives
that Plantinga wishes
to use also all
involve propositions
related to free will and
choices in
their consequents, eg
Sr,

(27)

Were 3od to do I,

3 would

freely choose A
and that could perhaps
become another point of
attach for the

atheologian.
First of all, it could
be maintained that any
subjunctive
of the form (A >
3) ls false if there is no real
connection
between the antecedent and
consequent.

iZusiiiz:.

blue shirt toTO

Consider

™’

the

n—

There being absolutely no
discernable connection between
antecedent and consequent,
the statement might
reasonably be
held to be false.

Similarly, it might be alledged
that if s's choice conearning A is really free,
Cod s actions in setting
the stage
'

so that 3 can freely choose
is relevant only to whether
or not
S

is

faced with a choice and
has nothing to do with what
S

freely chooses,

if that is right, then any
subjunctive like
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(27) in containing a choice
statement in the consequent

(except trivial cases eg., where antecedent
and consequent
are identical) must
be false

Or the a theologian could
cite Flantinga's claims
that
A 8 a ii ent feature of
£cauaal laws.] is that
.
.
they are said to support
or entail counter
factual 8
and later that
.

counter factuals

These two passages come
in support of Flantinga's
claim
that
•
•
•
the relationship between
causal laws and
counter factuals . . . is
both intl.te a^d notorious.

cn Flantinga's view, what
subjunctives are true in a
world
ie at the very least
to a significant extent
tied to the causal
laws of that world.
Flantinga's example of a causal
law is that
which supports (8); If
Robbins had slipped and fallen
at
rha.if.sgiving Leage,
is some causal

he would have been killed.

law of that type linking
Ood

•

s

But if there

actions to s's

choice, what might it mean
to say that that choice is
freel
And if there is no such
law, since subjunctives
evidently

require some sort of support,
what supports e.g.,
The
(27)
atheologian might argue that the
prudent move is to give up
claims that significant free
will subjunctives can be true.
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Charge and countercharge
could continue, but
suppose ..
shortcut the process b
y seeing what would happen
were Plantinga
to yield the field
to the atheologian
by admitting that
subjunctives like
(27) never came out true on any
admissible
ordering. It might seem
at first glance that
Plantingadefense would sustain no
damage, since Plantinga
ultimately
abandons (22) in favor
of the
one weaker and more
plausible claim
that in general
(2
'

)

(A

>

B)

v

rj

(A

>

8)

and that is surely true
regardless of the nature of
A, the

nature of

B, and

the nature of the ordering.

Thus if the
rest of his defense
holds up, he will be
successful as long
as he contents himself
with (28) rather than
appeal as well
to, say, (22).

But that response won't
work.

The reason is that the

argument involving transworld
depravity employs - as part
of
the i\iD definition - a
subjunctive of
the form

Were Sod to actualize the
maximal segment of
perfect world w, s would go
wrong relative to A

(29)

and it is essential that that
subjunctive can be true.

the atheologian wins the
current battle, Plantinga'

appears mortally wounded
1

1

ga COUld
.

defense

1
.

recon8truct the TWD
:fr subjunctives,
but that leads

!
,
negated

s

Thus if

definition to contain onlv
to further dlfficu1
difficulties
88 in

connection with Chapter III sentence
(28).

^
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That should not bother
Planting, though, because
there
la another defenae
very like his that now
see™ like it will
work. It is being
claimed, remember,
that anything line

Were Sod to do T,
S would freely choose
A
8t be fal3e °" any a
PP™P-ste ordering, either because
the
antecedent involves maximality
in the previously
specified
»ay, or because the
consequent involves a choice.
Now
although we do not yet know
exactly what the connection
is.
It is evident that,
as discussed earlier,
there is a connection
between what can be brought
about and what subjunctives
are
recycle the earlier example,
I can bring it about
as a matter of fact that
my study lamp is on,
because I can
(27)

“

flip the switch, ana it
is true in some
relevant sense that
were I to flip the switch
it would come on. and
it somehow

makes absolutely no difference
to my being able to bring
that
about that on infinitely many
orderings that subjunctive
comes out false.

Or if there is

a

snort in the lamp, my

ability to make it come on
by flipping the switch ia
lost even
though there are any number
of orderings on which it is
false
that were

I

to flip the switch nothing
would happen, because on

some ordering that somehow
counts, were

nothing would happen.

I

to flip the switch

Thus certain subjunctives and
certain

orderings are important.

But suppose the atheologian is
right

and that on all the important
(admissible) orderings,

(

27 ) and
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everything resembling it ha a + ~
has to come out
false.
(JO)

Then

Were and to do T, w
would result

must be false,
A,

(

27 )

if (30)
were tru»
'
t
then Slnce in w
’
5 chooses
would also be true,
similarly

(jl)

Were 3od to do T,

W

would result

-at

also be false, since
otherwise given that in
chooses not-A, it would
follow that
(

52 )

Were God to ao
do T
T,

u

<3
S
would

»

,

,

freely choose not-A

and on the present
view (J2) must be false
on all acceptable
orderings also, since
it resembles
(27) ln the requisite

respects
Thus if subjunctives
like (50) and
(Jl) must be false,
then there are no true
subjunctives indicating
results of

specific maximal segment
creative acts by Qod

.

That being so,

Sod of course cannot know
what the results would
be.
There is
no true proposition for
Him to know. Once He has
actualized

some maximal segment, then
He will foreknow what is
going to
happen - see (2o) - but
that is of no help to the
atheologian. 1
It will do no good to
Claim that
(55)

re God to do T, then
He would foreknow that
e*g., A was going to
happen

reiSus^in^^fao'rrTe ST*W
to
the actual

L!Ll

a ;.me n r°
atlon of alternative 0
would not be available^

»tC L

H ® * 111 in

l

a
t

U

“T

**

8 ° me

*>. and what the
fa0ta relative

P recrea tive consider-
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since that entails

27 ) whir>h , again,
Q ™is supposed to be
false.

(

-

Omniscience is generally
he i d to be lmowl9dge
of aU
true propositions,
and omniscience usually
figures in to

results of His creating
some maxi„l segment
would be, or
fecws what some agent
would do if created.
But if the opposition is right on the
issue at hand, a being
can be cm-

mscient

and know none of that indeed
-naeed, no h
being can know
1
any of that.
•

Thus 30d could be
omnipotent, omniscient, and
wholly
good, yet have to choose
some creative act over
another
without being sure of the
outcome of either, for the
simple
reason that there is no
outcome such that it would
result
from the appropriate
creative act. 2 Given that,
it is not

Yr

atio
“7( 22
?Tth
there still

be nothing like (50') or
fnr
since on that seL^i s
)“ u">
A
that either (a > B or
(a > ~ B) is tru7.
)
'

)>

.

\

er

ST!

tJe a biUtv
wo!ld alwavs h
weri g^

1

d

iffiouU y

iSs*™

f

1

-

will

”

1“

in granting an omniscient
being
The Pr ° blam 18
»uch a being

"s^ ^ JT&
3WTsZX
Ch ° 1Cee

n-

fS

r

h actlon

^

i. .
J ° d had n ° oholoe in His actions,
He surely
cannot be held morally
?f responsible
for their results,
of
course"’
“ iSht th8n ° harse that
,1* ’ h S
3od i3 •><* good, since
a
be S d ’ bUt the theist °° uld
S
8ti11 Perhaps
claim that
?hatod
K °r
uod had ?i
the best
possible character, where 'character'

“

129

clear what the existence
of evil is supposed to
count against,
in fact, „e might even
be able to make a
case for Bod not
being moral unless He
chose not to try for a
perfect world

at

an.

suppose that Bod's two
most likely-looking
maxi„l
segment options were
T- and T« , and that
T' would result in
either world a or world
b, and I" would
result in either
world o or world d.
Suppose farther that a is
perfect but
b unspeakable, while
c and d are both
in the middle.
It
might be immoral for
Bod to take a chance on
a, thereby
risking getting b, when
by doing T" He would
at least guarantee that the evil in
whatever world resulted
would not go
beyond some reasonable
limit. Additionally, some
game theorists
would tell us that the
rational choice in this case
is T ",
whereas choosing T' would
be irrational.
Surely we could not
fault God for being rational
and choosing T"
Besides that, if Plantings'
(S)(God can actualize,, s

is

s

principle (28) (Shapter
(3 C)(God can actualize
(SO > 5)))

HI)
0

4

sound, and if the contained
subjunctive is an instance of

(27),

then since on the present
view there will be no such true

is defined

^

subjunctively.

However, since virtually all nroocnoerned bo show ?hat
® threat to
th^threat
to^od"
uod s““"d
goodness emerges from the choices
0
Hee h*«
a
re 8Vi
ly preparsd t0 bor,:ed°e c?:ice
to
he
Zfln.T
r ’ thi9 ?
llne wlU
be pursued.
For farther discussion of some general
considerations surrounding choice and
b
preknowing, see Carl ainet 2
[ ] .

?

r

,r

subjunctive, the atheologically
essentia! claim that God
Could have actualized a
free perfect world
win si,„p ly be
falsa. Without disputing
the above principle,
the atheclogian simply cannot have
both W£>ya _ that

u

subjunctives are all fa l 8e
and that God could
have guaranteed
a free perfect world.
But either way he goes,
his case
seems to founder.

Of course, Plantinga's
principle may not be sound,
and
the case involving
T

.

and T . may not

ultlmUly

^

stand
but it is clear from
God's ensuing epistemological
position
alone that if Plantinga's
opponent prevails on the
present
point of contention concerning
the truthvalues of
(27)type subjunctives, he does
so oh pain of incurring
Plantinga's
gratitude.

The situation can be described
in the following way.

Suppose Hod is deliberating
concerning actualizing T or not.
If He does, either w or w*
will result, so He is considering
e.g., the statement that

0^)

Were He to do T,

w'

would result

He mows that (j4) is true on
some orderings, false on
others.

Now when we want to distinguish worlds
as far as

similarity to a base world, we do
so in
spects ci similarity.

terras

of various re-

What this amounts to in cases involvin

two worlds is that we fasten
upon some proposition 0 which we
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want held constant and
than examine the two
alternative worlds
to see in which of
the two 0 in fact
holds and tag that one
as the nearer of
the two.
Aa was discussed earlier,
subjunctives like
(J4) are

crucial to God's being
able to bring about
certain results.
If Ha can bring about
w' it is because
He can do T and
(}4)

ia true - not

just on any ordering,
but on one somehow

important ordering which
distinguishes w and
larity.

in simi-

Behind that ordering is
some feature 0, the holding

constant of which goes into
generating that ordering,
jjow
if God brings about
employing His ability to do
so which
la supported by the
truth of ( 5 4) on the ordering
the

relevant part of which is
generated relative to the holding
constant of 0, then 0 .mist
in fact be true.
But 0 is either
wholly in T or it is not.
If it is, since w and
both
contain 0, 0 cannot generate
an ordering placing w and
w' at

different levels of similarity
from the base.
wholly within T, it

is

If it is not

possible for the ordering it
generates

to distinguish between w
and w'

in similarity to the base,

but then, being not completely
within T, it cannot as a part

of

w or w'

be made true by God.

5° if (54)

is

true on an ordering which will support
an

ability statement to the effect that
God can bring about w',
that ordering must be based upon
some non-T factor 0 and if

1^2

that ability is to be
employed by Sod, 0 rust
in fact obtain.
But Sod cannot be behind
o', obtaining - since
0 is not wholly
within T, Hie being so would
violate the strictures on
T and
w and w'

Now if Sod actualizes T
either w or w

will result. la
there some factor which holds
in the general scheme of
things
which (although it cannot
be controlled by God, being
outside
T) will, upon Bod s creating,
push one of the two worlds
into actuality over the other?
In short, is there some 'real'
1

ordering of worlds upon which
e.g., (JO) or (Jl) is true
and
which will be effective if
Sod actualizes T? If the answer
ia

'no', then Sod cannot know
the results of specific arbitrary

creative acts and the existence
of evil is not decisive.
the answer is

yes',

If

then Plantinga's opponent has
lost the

immediate battle.
Again, when God is considering creating,
He wants to
*n°w wnat the result of creating
T will be.

specific answer or else the answer is

- it

other things are held constant in fact.

doing

f,

Either there is a
depends upon what

But God, if He is

cannot hold anything else constant in
fact - i.e.,

He cannot support the truth of anything else
ceasing to do T.

-

without thereby

Now either there is an answer concerning

what would happen were He to do
T without holding anything
constant, or there is not.

If there is one, Plantings has his
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Point.

If there is none, the
atheologian has lost on the

entire issue.
Let us then, out of charity
to the atheologian
declare
him the loser of this last
battle, concede Plantings
whatever
point it is he wants here,
and continue.
At the very least,
what Plantings wants is
that subjunctives like
(50) and ( 51
)

can be true on some
ordering which - unlike some
other

orderings - allows them to
be relevant to discussions
concerning
results that God might get as
outcomes of various creative
acts.
Along with most present-day
philosophers, Plantings

accepts the view that subjunctives
are modal and world

relative - that is, only with
respect to some world or other
can a subjunctive be assigned
a truth value,

Plant inga

s

since two of

major tools - Principle
(28) (Chapter III) and

the TWD definition - contain
subjunctives, it is only natural

that we ask what world it is
that those subjunctives are true

relative to.

The answer (which Plantings gives
in [6 ] p. 48)

is that they are 'to be true
in fact,

in the actual world

1

.

Given that, the following sort of
objection beckons,

if

the subjunctives are analyzed
relative to this world (call
it

<*

again) then if, for instance,

S

suffers TWD, it is true

in this world that had God
actualized the maximal segment of

perfect world w (say, T), S would have
performed some wron^

action.

But of what relevance
could that have been to
Sod's

original ability to createT

Let us for the accent
lapse into

a temporal mode

of discourse and consider
the situation prior
to Sod's doing any
creating at all, and
picture Sod as looking
over the whole panoply
of possible worlds as a
prelude to
choosing one to bring
about. A number of facts
confront Sod.
There are, He sees, two
worlds - „ and

- which share

w'

maxima, segment T, and w
is the more desirable
of the two.
There is also some third
world, <*, that does not
contain T
but in which it is true
that were He to do T, w'
would result.
But there is, additionally,
a fourth world,
and in

p,

is true that were He to
do T, w would result,

p it

of course,

none of those four worlds is
yet actual, since the envisioned
scene is precreative, but
somehow, if Plantinga's arguments
are correct, the truth-in-«
of one subjunctive precludes
God from creating w, even
though the truth-in- (3

evidently does not bar God from
creating w

0 f the other

'

What relevant difference could
account for that disparity?
Cne fact we now have
not seem enough.

is

that

did become actual, but that might

Had Sod actualized T, either w
or w' would

have been actual, and

c*

would not, never would have been,
and

never would have been going to
be actual.
specified subjunctive in
to what God

c*

is supposed

Yet the truth of the

to have some relevance

could have done even had He been
going to do differ-

1^5

ently than He in fact did.
To tame a parallel case,
suppose that

not a world

in w hloh it ls true

»

(distinct from

«

^

° 0Uld

n0t h8Ve Created

*

>

«
of

'a

K

19 actual)

uncreatability
,

,

mximal

^^^

had

^
Thus

it ls the oaBe that
<*

it is the case

yet God did create

so the precreative truth
in

i

*,
of

was evidently an interesting
feature

but had no particular
force.

precreative truth in

»

J<*t as in

that God could not have
created w.
(at least, o<

,

but sharing M) would
have resulted.

by an apparently
parallel argument, in

G °d

^

«

S o why was not the

0 f the uncreatability

an interesting feature
of

o<

of „ merely

?

It might again be replied
that as a matter of fact

<*

became actual, so w's
uncreatability became actually
true
rather than simply true-in-«.
But that response will not do.

Nothing Stopped God from creating

X, and were

JC

actual it

would be actually true now
that o< was uncreatable rather
than
just true-in- ) . But it is
easy to see that that truth could
not have stopped God from
originally tawing the course which

He in fact took - creating <*.

That God could have taken

that course is shown by the fact
that He did.

from that it

would appear that the current truth
of w's uncreatability is

really irrelevant to what God could
have done had He chosen
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differently than He did.

The actual truth of w's
unoreat-

ability is merely an
interesting aide effect of
the decision
to actualize
«, rather than a factor that had
to be taken
into account in making
any such decision.

we can get a slightly
different angle on this same
objection if we switch into
world talk. Although
as noted
earlier Plantings experiences
some unease over possible
world semantics for
subjunctives, for purposes
of discussion
he does accept what was
earlier called a skeletal
view of the

Stalnaker-type semantics,

Given this provisional
acceptance

of world analysis, that
subjunctives are world relative
and
rnodal,

is

and that the base world for
Plantinga's subjunctives

the actual world, that
3 would go wrong were 3od
to do T

translates to something like
In the nearest world to
does T, 3 goes wrong

(55)

in which God

What that tells ua is that if
we begin at

along the ordering, the
be w'.

fir<?t T-unrin
+
world +that
we come
1

If we continue on, we eventually
get to

truth of

(

55) guarantees that w'

is

we cannot traverse the ordering
from

through w

Death

o<

upon will
but the

and w, and that

to w without going

you simply can't get there (w)
from here (o<).

Plantinga argues that if

able by God

between

w,

and proceed

in short, without walking through
the Valley of

.

(W)

*

.

(

55 ) is true, then w is

unbeat-

Admittedly, 3 od does not want to
get stuck with
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w,

and there is nothing
that He oan do to
ensure w over
but since what leads
to the problem is His
starting from

hare (<*), the previous
question can be rephrased;
He start from here to begin
with?

doubt Plantings

1

s

why should

response would begin with
the charge

that we have been misled
by traditional locutions
about God
creating worlds, since we
cannot very reasonably
demand that
God actualize Himself
(as Plantings points out),
talk of God
creating worlds has naturally
led to a tacit conceptual
removal of God from within
the structure of possible
worlds.
(In fact, the present objection
was partially motivated
by
talk of God sitting back and
looking over various possible
worlds precreatively - when
none were actual.)

But that aort of move leaves
us without any way of

handling contingent propositions
about God, and Plantings
plainly thinks that there are
such.

Thus, whatever it is

that God actualizes, it is not
full-blown worlds, since He

Himself is part of them.

30 just as we humans originally

find ourselves in a situation
not of our choosing at birth,

and what we can do about it
depends in part upon our powers
and the sorts of results our
actions engender, God, says

Plantings in effect, finds Himself
situated in a manner not

ontirely of His choosing, and what
He can do about it also
depends in part upon His powers and
the sorts of results His

1J8

actions will elicit - i.e.,
upon what subjunctives are
true
relative to that base, of
course, God's powers are
not non-

loglcally limited as ours are what it is logically possible
that He strongly bring
about. He can - but there
are certain
subjunctives that He is subject
to, and there are
consequent
limits on the results He can
(even weakly) achieve. Just
which subjunctives are true is
a matter tied u
P with just
which world it is in which we
all found ourselves.
So now we see why we cannot
demand of God that He have

created out of a different context
than He did, and the
purported objection fails.

We can perhaps also see

a

bit

further into the earlier question
of why some orderings are

important to abilities and some not.
//ere 3

(-0

to do A

,

B

Consider

would result

and assume that S can do
A, and that A is S's only possible

action relevant to B.
Plantings

'

s

We ask - can 3 bring about B?

answer seems to be that if (i) is true
he can, and

if (i) is false he cannot.
(i)

is ambiguous,

But remember that anything like

and we have to know what is being held

constant and only then can we investigate
what impact the

truth of the antecedent will have on the
truth value of the
consequent.

Suppose that ordering 0 involves holding constant

C,

and
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Hq

"t#

on 0

(

k

x

^

)

true. ^

1q

.»

,

.

and 3 does A, B will
result.

holding constant

Plantinga

.

We oan then eay that lf
o obta na

»

O'

Suppose that O' involves

and that on O'

(i)

is

false.

On

view, if o' obtains and
3 does A, B will not

result
Thus in order for 3 to be
able to bring about B, (i)

muat be true on 0 and
C must in fact obtain.

In the case of

Were God to do T, w would
result

(50)

we have a parallel setup.

In order for God to be able
to

bring about w, there must
be an admissible 0" involving
a
O'

1

on which

(

50 )

is

true, and in the world in
which God

finds himself, 0" must in
actual fact, apart from anything
God does, be true.

behind Plantinga'

s

It is this whole idea which is,

I

think,

apparent suspicion that we do not
get to

pick an arbitrary ordering when
considering various subjunctives in various contexts.
This is not to say that if
(JO) is true on ordering 0"

then
(50a)

(God does T

&

0"

obtains)

—^

w results

lln S eneral » there is no one
proposition that is held constant
in an ordering.
Rather there is a fUzzy set of
propositions,
members of which are peeled off as we
progress away from the
base world. However, between any
two worlds the situation can
be regarded as a case of one (no
doubt complex ) proposition beinr
decisive in virtue of holding in one
world and not the other.
Since the cases of ultimate interest here
are basically twoworld cases (e.g., w and w'), the
difficulties with longer
orderings will be bypassed.

14o

but only that if the
truth of (50) on orderlns „
0
i0 uhat
supports 3 od's ability to
bring about w then at
,
th#
God cannot in fast bring
about w unless 0" obtains.
But
of course, if 0 » is part of
T, then it does not
provide the
basis for an ordering
separating w and w' (which
share T)
and we again have „ arid
tied on the important
ordering,
the consequences of which
have already been discussed.
And
if 3" is not completely
within T, then it is, by
hypotheses,
not totally under God's
control.

^

So (JO) is either true or
false depending upon what

ordering we pick.

But each ordering involves
the holding

constant of some unique factor
or other,

bemg

such a factor -

outside T - 13 outside God's
control, and just which

order-generating factor actually obtains
is a contingent
matter
This, of course, is another
place where Flantinga's

pointing out that God is within a
world comes in.

Within

any world, some factor will obtain
and others will not, and
if such factors are contingencies,
there are worlds in which
the factor holding in those worlds
is one relevant to the

crucial ordering for (JO) - and thus
only in those worlds can
it be true that God brings
about w - and there are worlds in

which the relevant factors are ones
not relevant to the
crucial ordering - and in those worlds
it is false that God
could have brought about w.

But God finds Himself in some

I4l

particular world, and the
determining factor relative
to (JO)
is one not under
Hie control, but ie,
aince the world la
actual , held constant In
fact, and thua whether
or not it la
true in fact that He
could have chosen to
bring about „ is
not under His control
'and never was.
However, farther difficulties
seem to arise involving
choices and the placing
of Sod within a world,
when we say
that S could choose
either to do or to not do
some action A,
what do we mean, We
obviously cannot mean just
that there is
a world in which
S does A and one in wnlch
he does not do A.
We might mean something to the
effect that s can either
make
it the case that the
actual world is a non-A world,
or make
it the case that the
actual world is an A-world.
of course,

that does not mean that
3 could

.sake it

the case that

A-world, or a non-A world,
since whether or not

<*

is an

is an A-

world is a matter of necessity,
and S certainly does not
determine necessities. Does it
mean, then, that 3 could
determine
w bother or not

i9

a c tua 1 ?7
actual

bit difficult to harness.

If

t
n+n
Intuitions

is an

concerning that are

a

A-world. we want to say

that S could have refrained
from A, and that that he did
not
is

part of what made it the case
that

say,

=<

is actual rather than,

But when could 3's choice of
A, or the fact that

3

was going to do A have exerted
any pressure in determining

that the one world was actual rather
than the other?

We can't

have facta running around
loose outside worlds,
ye t once the

been the actual world.

There has never been a
time when it

was not, and thue
just how choicea
determine actuality is
a bit unclear.

Although this line looks
perilously close to
the modal error of
arguing that 3 could
not have done other
than he did since that
he
would do A was always
true, it is

not being suggested that

determination that
is a bit hard

to

«

S' a

doing A does not figure
into a

is actua! - it does but only that it

visualize the mechanics of
that admitted

determination.

Fuzzy as our intuitions may
be on this point, it
still
might seem that if the
difficulty of where Sod starts
from is
to be sidestepped by
appealing to the eternal actuality
of a
particular world which restrains
God to some extent, we have
to be exceedingly careful
in trying at the same
time to
salvage the meaningfulness
of choice by claiming that in
some
y choices which will oe made (by God,
too) predetermine which
world it is that has been
eternally actual. Depending upon

exactly how the salvage operation
goes, the atheologian might
be able to come back and ask why
God was not such that He was

going to choose in such

a

way that those choices would pre-

ordain an eternally existing
situation from which He could and
would choose and act with the
results that Plantings claims

14 }

that He perhaps cannot
get.

oho

To begin our exploration
of the interrelationship
between
and worlds, let us note
an interesting feature

of

structures.

In setting up such
systems we allow ourselves

eupply of atomic sentences
which can then be evaluated
at
world -times, such sentences,
being simple and atomic,
have
no interesting entailments
for times other than
those at
which they are evaluated true
except that if P i 8 evaluated
a

true at <w,t>
at <w,t

then for all

,

>

.

f,

that P is true at <w,t> is

Suppose we pick some arbitrary
world

time t and consider the set

5

w

and

of all the atomic sentences
P

such that for each of them
there is some

that P is evaluated true at
<w,f>

.

t'

prior to t such

since the members of

that set do not, either singly
or in chorus, entail the

truth of any atomics at times
subsequent to
particular set

S'

such that

S'

S'

is

closure of S U

there is no

is composed of atomic

sentences evaluated true at various
such that

t,

t»

subsequent to

t,

and

the only such set for which the
deductive
S'

is

maximally consistent.

In short, there

can be more than one world which up
to some point t has a

particular set of atomics evaluated at
various times true
in it.

If for the moment we consider a world to be
(or at

I believe that something like
this idea was behind some brief
remarks by David Kaplan in
[j] (p. 1}1) about worlds that
overlap'. Baruch A. 3rody [l] has made similar
remarks.

ieast be associated
with) such a

really

consistent set
generated from atomics,
then the view that
we get is of a
number of worlds
paralleling each other
up to point t, after
which they go their
separate ways, if „e
were to give a
linear representation
against time of all such
possible
worlds which share a
common history to point
t, we would
have a collection of
lines all running
parallel up to point
*' then b6£lnnlns t0 fa
" ° ut
representation of different
possible futures from t.

“

het us in fact adopt this
visualization, and call any
such structure a tree.
The trunk extends to point
t, and is
composed of the paralleling
parts of the relevant
worlds. At
t, the worlds begin
to diverge, going off
in different
directions, each ultimately
emerging as a separate
branch of
the tree.

There might be those who
even at this early point
would
register protests, it might
be ctarged,

for instance, that no

such structure could be
generated from atomic sentences,
since
we simply do not have
enough sentences. If we are
talking
about characterizing worlds
with atomic sentences, „e
will have
to have indenumerably many
such sentences, and that demand

puts rather more strain on
a language than any can
bear.

The point is well enough taken,
but tells against trees
in no particular way in
which it does not also tell
against the
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usual modal and temporal
logics.

All such systems more or

less tacitly presume the
fiction that the requisite
sentences

are available, and for
present purposes this traditional
fiction will be adopted.
(If it becomes ultimately
untenable,
however, we can employ Humean
events (of which we can
allow
ourselves all „ e want), and
construct trees by mapping
possible courses of events staring
common histories.)
It might also be objected that we
cannot ao blithely

associate sets such as the closure
of

5 U

S'

with individual

worlds since that closure would
contain only simple and compies truth functional statements,
but would not contain

modal statements - for instance,
subjunctives - which are

important constituents of worlds.

Thus, any such set could

at best be associated with some
set of worlds.

That

objection, however, seems to presuppose
that we can have two
worlds wnich differ only in subjunctives
(and trivial

entailments of those subjunctives) and it
that that's right.

is

not at all obvious

The intuition behind such a claim might

be something like this:

subjunctives are odd in that they do

not seem to exert any real force within a world
just as (some

have claimed) causality does not.

We can check up on ante-

cedents, consequents, and parallels between similar
cases, and
in some instances determine falsehood, but we cannot
within a

world really pin down subjunctives.

Possible world analyses
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to some extent emphasizes
this by employing only
material
cond itionala within worlds,
and by placing all the
real

weight on an extra-worldly
feature - ordering.

But if we

really do have to appeal to
ordering, then nothing strictly
Internal to a world entails the
relevant subjunctives in
that world, and thus two
worlds could differ only In
sub-

junctives
A

possible response is that world
structure is in fact

rigid, and that if e.g.
33 w«,

f

w is closer to w'

it is necessarily closer,

on ordering 0 than

since otherwise, the

ordering would not be the one
specified.

Thus within any

world it is true that the set
of propositions defining w is,

on criterion 0, nearer the set
defining w' than that deter-

mining w", and that is something
derivable within any world being

a

purely logical matter.

Thus, subjunctives are an

entirely intra-world matter, and it

is

not necessary that we

line up and pace off a bunch of worlds,
although that is

perhaps intuitively helpful.

There are

a

number of mechanisms that could be cited as

giving rise to forks in
a bit

1

a tree,

but we may be able to simplify

by interpreting all forks as being representative
of

With some modification, the discussion in this
and the pre
ceeding paragraph can be extended to all modal
statements.
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choices.

For instance, if a sunspot
erupts at some time

t,

it does so only because
Qod chose to actualize
some maximal
segment containing that
occurrence. Thus, forks
encountered

within a tree, no matter what
sort of event or atomic sentence they correspond with, can
be construed as choices,
either human or God's.
To interpret a tree,

let us view ourselves as
members of

an expedition moving in the
time axis direction within a
tree. At every for* we come
to, whoever it is whose
choice
that fork represents must step
up and pick a branch - to

choose is just to direct the
expedition at specified forks.

Actual history will be just the path
that has been followed
to the present - just that path
which has been determined

by the actual choices of all agents,
God included.

The real

world will turn out to be the world
associated with whatever

path it is over which all choices which
have been made, and

which ever will be made, will go together
to direct the
expedition.
It is here that the puzzle concerning the
mixing of

choices and worlds roust be confronted.

Intuitively, since

some particular world (<*) has always been actual i.e.,

since our expedition has always been marching along
on the
path - and since we do not seem to be able to now bring
it about that in fact

(3

has always been actual - i.e., since
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our expedition can't
go leapfrogging from path
to path it look. SB though either
we are locked Into thia
partic-

ular path or else what we
do now somehow contributed
to
our always having been on
thia path. For 3 to do
other
than, say, A, would
be for all of ua to have always
been
on a different path, for ua
to have done everything
done

up to t as part of a different
world than this one.

Thus

even within the trunk of a
treo, we are walled off from
the

other to-that-point-id entical
worlds.

An alluring intuition is that had
S been going to do
non-A, then everything bacic to forever
would have, being
all part of a different world, been
subtly different than
it is.

That, however, simply need not
be the case in any

modal theory except counterpart theory
(and that that is
the case in counterpart theory has
been at the bottom of

some criticisms of the theory - see
e.g., Saul Kripke
Let us consider a parallel case.

under construction.

W

).

Suppose a building is

The cornerstone has been laid, but the

builders have yet to decide at that point,
whether to stop
at ten floors or to go for twenty.

They decide upon ten.

It turns out, then, that the cornerstone
has always been going
to be in the foundation of a ten story
building.

they had gone for twenty.

But suppose

Then it would have been the case

that the cornerstone had always been going to be in
the found-
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ation of a twenty atony
building.

But that does not Imply
that had they gone twenty,
the cornerstone would
have all
along been a different
stone than the one In
fact used.
There would be a complex
property that the stone
would have in
one case - being In the
foundation of a ten floor
building that it did not have in
the other, but that it has
it is

merely a trivial result of
the fact that the building
stopped at ten.

That property is simply a
logical glue-

on, What S.E. Moore would
have called 'purely external'.

The stone is exactly the same
stone in both cases.

Wow consider some time
that s does

Sit

t1

.

f

Suppose also that in ot and

does 0 at t', but that S does
t

in

prior to t, and act 0 such

HUM,

(3

s

and not-A at

and that those are the only
relevant acts in those

(?,

worlds, so that
(

ii

does A at t —*>

S

)

(

So if 3 does A at t, so that

we could say that S did 3 at

f

t' )(

o<

c*

lias

is actual at t

m

3

(

.

)

always been actual,

as part of <*

.

Similarly,

were S to do not-A at t, then
S would have done 0 at
part of

1

t'

as

But again, that does not imply that the past -

thls case 3'

a

doing 3

- would

have been subtly different.

As with the stone, exactly one case of

S' a

and that exact same act is in both
worlds.

doing 3 is involved,
We need not deal

with two act tokens, or some such, one in
each world.

That if
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5

does A, 0 will have been done
as a constituent of

o<

is

another instance of a logical
glue-on.

If worlds are delineated by
atomics, then presumably
segments of worlds are also,
so we can take the trunx
section of each world- in

a

tree as being the set of
atomics

evaluated true at times up to
the time t where the forking

begins.

But that worlds are parallel up
to t simply

amounts to that they share all
atomics evaluated true up to
t

(as well as entailments of
such).

Thus all the worlds

within a tree have exactly one
trunk section common to all.
That that trunk can be a part of
distinct worlds does not,
again,
with.

imply that more than one trunk
entity

is

being dealt

In each world, up to t, exactly
the same entities do

exactly the same things at exactly the
same time exactly at
the same places.

m

We could, of course, talk about variations

logical glue-ons, such as that the trunk
is in fact actual

as part of

o<

,

but that has no interesting consequences.

Thus there is exactly one trunk such that
no matter which

of a number of worlds parallel to t
is part

is actual,

that one trunk

of it, and if one of the other worlds were
actual,

the self-same trunk would still be actual.

Only the glue-ons

change, and they are not part of any world
segment.
It might be objected that we're here playing
fast and

loose with Leibniz Law, and that objection might
be spelled out
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in the following
manner

,

suppose two worlds - „
and

share some trunk segment
T.

again -

Suppose farther that „ and

w'

differ in that at some
point subsequent to the
trunk, A occurs
in w and not in w>.
But nothing ca n have
both the property
of subsequently containing
A and the property of
not subsequently containing A. Thus
there must be two separate
trunk
segments involved - one for
each world.
The reply, of course, is
that nothing in what has
been
said implies that something
does have both of the
abovenamed properties. The trunk
does not contain either of
the
complex properties 'subsequently
containing A' or 'not subsequently containing A . In
one of the worlds the brunt
segment is such that A is
subsequently done in that world,
and in
'

the other world the trunk
is such that A is not
subsequently

done in that world, but that
need not be taken as implying
that the trunk segments are
distinct unless e.g., that Jones
is

in one world with bald
Smith and in another world with

hirsute Smith implies that two
Joneses are involved.
is

Yet it

not generally charged that any
logical law has been vio-

lated in claiming that there is
really only one Jones who is
in the two worlds.

It seems reasonable, then, to claim that

the w trunk just is the w' trunk,
and that the only interesting

difference in this case is in where things
go after w and
diverge.

w'
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So It is not the case
that in

parallels

*

,

the trunk aeotion merely

(3

and that thus there
is a difficulty about
doing

things that would have as

a

consequence that we had always

been on a different - although
parallel - route.

There is

only one trunk, and no natter
which of the worlds is
actual,
we are in that trunk, and
in the trunk segment
of that world.
Any differences a.re in £cuin-*label
u*
x
°
properties, which
are merely
trivially entailed - via
statements on the order of (ii) *

by what we do.
3o choices are what determine
what path we take, and

thus what ultimately determine
what world is actual.

We are

not locked into any particular
path - we can (logically)

choose to take whatever twists and
turns within the tree we

want to.

Within

a

intuitively want;

tree,

choices are effective in the way we

they do not pre-ordain the past in
some

mysterious manner - (ii)

ia

simply

a

necessary truth, and it

altera none of the bones of the past yet there is a clear
sense in which actuality rides on them.

To go back to a

previous case, the actual world is an A-world
if and only if
3

chooses to do A, i.e., the expedition passes
along an A-

path if and only if s directs it into such

a

path at the

appropriate fork.
We can al9o talk about such a tree from the
viewpoint of
a single agent.

Suppose we construct

a

tree containing all and
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only possible courses of
events which Involve some
choice by
and
call that s's original tree.
5,
Any path through this
tree will (up to the time that

3

ceases) be a possible life

for s.

But now,

0

+

course, a complication arises.

We have been

dealing with logically possible
choices and paths, but obviously riot all such possible choices
are choices really available
to 3 in every context.

For instance, it is possible
that

some actusl person S choose to fly
to the warmer climate of

Mercury

for the winter, but that is
not an available choice

for 3 if s happens to have been
born into the present context
in 1900 .

Thus we must/ distinguish between

and

(5^)

0

(3 choo ses

(57)

S

can choose (or do) A

(or does

)

A

(the distinction is that between possibility
vs. actually being

able)
In order to reflect that, we merely take
S's original tree,
and prune from it all those branches
which are not representative of available options for S,

i.e., we remove from S's

original tree all paths representing possible lives
that for
one reason or another

s

could not have lived.

There are many factors that operate to make various
possible lives unliveable.

The fact that as humans we are
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born into P re- e xi a «n
3 contorts eliminates many
paths from the
collection of choices we
have. Per instance,
being born lnto
certain contexts blocks
3 from beinoa hi
+
cemg able
to choose to fly to
Mercury for the winter. Phvsimi
n removes other paths * 1 / 81ca l
law
none of us can choose
to leap tall buildings
in a single
bound. Shoices by Sod
are also effective - >,
3
choice to
climb the three peaks
higher than Everest is
done away with
because Sod chose not to
create any such peaks.
choices by
other agents figure in S' s option to kick the
tires on his

neighbor's car can be ruled
out by his neighbor's
choosing
not to buy a car, or by
the local bandit's choosing
to
remove the tires for purposes
of his own.
It is at this point that
subjunctives become relevant,
too.

It is certainly possible
that
5 chooses

(5^)

to go to the local and
meet S'

- 3 has within hie
original tree the appropriate
path.

suppose that

3'

But

has just found out that
3 is a rabid fan of

the hated (by s') Toledo
Mudhens, and
(5-v

If (59)

)

is

Were 3 to go to the local,
3
go somewhere else

'

true, the branch corresponding
to

would choose to

(

58 ) is removed

from the available tree for
3.
:le

Can 3ee that although we all
have enormous original

trees, those trees are pared down
drastically, once we become
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actual - i.e., once we
join the expedition by contingent
facts involved with
the pre-existing
context which are beyond
our control.

Although trees have not
been defined in full
rigor
(they are, at this point,
only intuitive excavation
aids)
we can understand them
sufficiently to enable us
to charact-

enze

sortie

(^°)

key locutions in terms
of trees.

i^an_^^e_to _bring

abou t _A is true at t iff
g
there is a path from s' 8
positi^Tin
3 a available tree at t through
an
A-point, and that path does
not
involve a choice by any other
agent

where an A-point is simply
that point within the available
tree at which A is found
3_can choose to bring about,,
A is true at t iff
there is a path from 3's
position“in
S a available tree at t through
an
A-point, and there is no part of
that path which involves a
choice
by any other agent and which is
not
sub junctively guaranteed.

The notion of a subjunctive
guarantee is just an old friend
in fresh paint.

Suppose that 3 wanted the chance to do

that that depended upon s' doing
B.
(42)

Were

S to do A,

S'

0,

but

Were

would do B

true, then if A were within
S’e sphere of influence, he could do
A and thus sub junctively guarantee himself
the opportunity to do
r%

^

•
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(* 5 )

—
—

brin fi about a ia true
in

S'
available tree through an
A-point

s

° Uld
* is true at t
ff there is a path
from S' a position
S 8 callable tree at some
time
r t ° 1 throu h an
Pr
A-point
£
and
that
J
path does
not involve a choice by
.

^

any other agent
(45)

5 could hav

chcaer. t° brln^ shoot.

* ia true at t
there is a path from s's
position
in S s available tree
at some time
prior to t through an
A-point, and
there is no part of that
path which
involves a choice by any
other agent
and which is not
subjunctively Uar _
ij_£

o-

-

(46)

T?t iff
afnthere

frrfr
true
r at

ms

t0 ° h0O8e t0 brlne ahfmt *
is a path from S's
position
-

s available tree
at some time
prior to t through an
A-point

It will be noticed that the
above characterizations are
not
in every respect parallel
to the strong and

bringing about' advanced by
Plantings.

weak notions of

The difference, however,

ia due entirely to the temporal
indexing employed in the above,

and when that indexing is
removed, as it will be later, the

differences collapse.
He must now ask how Flantinga's
defense fits into the above,
and the answer seems to be
'smoothly'.

To begin with, we must

notice that there is no particular
available tree such that
were some possible person
p made actual, he would have it.

Consider any available tree that
p could have if made actual now,
and it can be seen to differ from
any available tree that F
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night have had had he been
born into the

l7

th century.

T he

-enable

tree that anyone has
depends upon contingent
factors,
any of which might
have been otherwise.
Second, we must see that
God too, has His own
available
fee, influenced by - among
other things - human
choices.

These two points, of course,
are exactly what Plantinga
been trying to get us
to see - that God must
be within
the same structure that
we are, and that tl*t
structure cannot be made large enough
for all of us to exercise
all 0 f 0 ur
possible options within it.
The defense looks like this,

if G od ie going to be able

to choose to create a
free perfect world w,

there has to be a

path corresponding to that
world in His available tree.
But
any such path must involve
the choices of other agents,
so
aod could not have chosen
to bring about that world
- (44).
Q
but to bring it about

w requires a subjunctive guarantee,

;/ere Bod

is

w would

result

false, the subjunctive guarantee
ie missing and Bod could
not

bring about w w
(^o)
is

to do T,

and if

(

45 ).

In fact,

were Bod to do T,

if
w'

would result

true, not only is the subjunctive
guarantee missing, there is

not even a path for w in God's available
tree and thus of course

He could not have chosen to have taken
that path.
And since the structure of any given
tree is contingently
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God's tree could have
been entirely ta#|dng
paths representing free
perfect worlds, or there
might have
been no subjunctive
guarantees at all. *. oan
lnterprel
omnipotence as having an
available tree in which
every path
such that it is consistent
that the agent bring
it about
8
contained in it. since
it is consistent that
God's
available tree be of that
sort yet be devoid of
free perfect
paths, the defense doe.
not sacrifice omnipotence.

^

.

With the above apparatus,
we can finally get all
of
Plantings', responses on on.
screen. On. objection was
that
God should have created out
of some other context, if
the

context out of which He did
create was such as to
preclude
creation of a free perfect
world. Plantings', response
that
ood is as much in a world as
we are can be translated
to
mean that Ood, like all of
ue, finds Himself, because
of

uncontrollable contingencies
involving

a, song

other things

free choices, with a certain
available tree, and the structure

of that tree is something
within which Ood must operate.
To demand that He have started
with a different tree is no

more reasonable than telling
someone who doesn't like his lot
in life that as long as he
didn't arrange to be born into

different circumstances he has only
himself to blame.
The other objection was that by
placing Ood within a
world, intuitions concerning tho
choices that were central to
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Plantinga's defense were
lost
8t, ‘

Th«
4
The foregoing
hopefully by.

passes that.
30 far, it looka as though
trees provide us with the

sort of picture that Plahtinga
is trying to draw.
». have
sod - like us - subject
to a specific structure
of actuality,
thus avoiding purported
problems of where God starts
from;
that structure allows an
account of God's and our
choices,

without getting us into certain
intuitional difficulties;
and the structure allows
for the incorporation of
the sub-

junctives and contingencies
upon which Plantinga's case is
ultimately based.
Now, however, two difficulties
emerge - one minor, one
a bit trickier.

When Plantings insists that the
subjunctives be evaluated relative to the actual world,
that is his way of

making explicit that God is
operating within some limited
context of actuality, just as we
are.

Although God must have

His own available tree, we do not
know the structure of that

tree but we do know that

<*'s path is in it,

since the actual

result a od gets from creation must
be represented within Hie

available tree, and

i8

the actual result of God's creating.

Plantings further wants to argue that
it

is

possible that all

the subjunctives thtt he cites are
true relative to

of,

and

that is simply plantinga's way of saying
that it is possible
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^

that the available tree
which 8 od i 8 i„ faot
faced
con .
tame no free perfect path.
But the relevant factors
determining which ordering
is the crucial one
are fixed by preexisting context, and
whether or not the
subjunctives in
question are true on- that
'real' ordering is a
tatter of
necessity. Thus it may be
that the tree which
Sod in fact has
is not such that it is
possibly devoid of free
perfect
worlds.
If it was possibly such,
then it would be such and
we would have not merely
a defense but a theodicy,
and

rlantinga claims to be formulating
only a defense.

For all

we know it is possibly such,
but that, of course, tells
us
no more about its actual
nature than the epistemic
possibility of Ooldbach-s conjecture
tells us about its mathematical

possibility.
But of course, it is consistent
that God be faced with

such a tree - it is just that
we can't put into it an arbi-

trary path, such as

<*

•

8

.

And that

u

is con8iatent

ifl

ftU

that is needed for a defense.
So rather than claiming that
it is possible that all the

relevant subjunctives be true in

<*,

it should be claimed

only that there is some world such
that all the relevant
subjunctives are true relative to it.

Of course, what

Plantinga said was that they were to be
true 'in the actual
world'.

Perhaps what he meant was that there was
some world
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Wi

“

a is

tent that

" hiCh th ° Se aUb
j“"‘“’es ware true, and

^

have been actual.

it was con-

In any oaae , whataver

problem there might have
been i. easily fixed
up.
The second difficulty is
a bit more
complicated.
Plantinga argues that if

W)
13 true,

m

Were Sod to do
then no (t 4

is false,

-A)

T,

w would result

world is reachable, and
that if

then no (T & A) world
is reachable.

That

begins to look not quite
right.

Suppose, for example, that
God's available tree contains two branches
splitting off from His T-fork one in
which w results and one in
which
results. In that case
(50)

<v

(Were God to do T, w would
result)

because were that subjunctive
true, it would have ruled
out
the path representing w’
and for a parallel reason
,
(51)

«i

(Were God to do T,

w'

would result)

But according to Plantinga, if
(50) is true, w is simply

not to be gotten out of God's
available tree;

but it is there

because we just stipulated it
there.

What God cannot do is subjunctively
guarantee

w,

but it

does not follow from that that
He cannot create and get free

perfect world w as a result.

conclusion.

Yet Plantinga winds up with that

To see what the difficulty is,
we shall have to

examine his Principle 28.
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Principle 28 is
(S

)

"this;

(God can actualize s <
°

t

w
q n
^
0)(CJod can actualize
(GO > 3)))

s

&

The principle sounds
plausible.

If an agent is able to
bring something about
at all, there must be
something totally
under his control such that
his doing that thing
triggers the
result in question, and
if there is some such thing,
then the
result is one he can bring
about. If 0 entails
s, then 5 is
strongly brought about.
Otherwise, 3 is weakly brought
about.
Nevertheless, P28 may not be
adequate. Suppose that we
have a random number generator
which works off the spontaneous

decay of some heavy element,
so that there
non-etatistical law involved.

is

no governing

That being the situation, there

are many worlds identical to
this one up to some time t at

Which 3 pushes a button and the
generator flashes a number of
its screen,
since there is no governing
non-statistical law,
3

may get a different number in
every world and thus it might

reasonably be held that for any
number n, it

is

not the case

that w.re 3 to push the button n
would come up.

But it does

not follow from that that
seven.

3

can't push the button and get

a

He can, if he's lucky, but he cannot
guarantee it.

Now in God's available tree, there are
three relevant
possible situations with respect to
any path within that tree;
(i) no agent other than God is
actively involved in that path
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(e.g.,

(40))j

(il) agents other
than Qod are Involved,
but

path segments involving
the activities of such
agents are
subjunctively guaranteed (e.g., 1
and (lu) agent8
( , 1 ));
other than 3od are involved
and there are path
segments
involving such agents not
subjunctively guaranteed (e.g.,
(* 5 )).
In thia last caee, there
is nothing baring that
path

from being travelled, and
it will be if all the
requisite
choices happen to be made.
However, 3od cannot guarantee
it,
as He can in either of
the first two cases by
either strongly
bringing it about, or by talcing
advanta.ce of the appropriate

subjunctives.

There seem, then, to be cases
where there is

no operative subjunctive, where
thus

a

particular result

cannot be guaranteed even within
the bounds of the pre-

vailing situation, but within which
the achievement of that
particular result is still not precluded,

m

those cases, it

will not follow from the falsity
of the relevant subjunctive
that the desired result is
unobtainable.
Thus, Plantings'
and weak; cases,

s

P28 seems to be adequate for the strong

but there appears to be a still weaker
one

which it does not cover.
matter.

Happily for Plantings, that does not

Notice that the only situations in which that
weakest

sense of 'bring about'

is

appropriate are those in which there

is no relevant subjunctive,

and as we've seen, in those cases
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th * atheolo 1 ° al
6

The upshot is this.

fails on epistemic
grounds alone.

Piantinga rests one side
of his

defense on a clain, that if
e.g., (4 9 is false,
)
w is not
creatively reachable. W e
reject that oUi. as a
general
one, but conveniently,
there is a related defense
that
covers exactly those points
which the retrenching of
the
old defense exposes*
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CHAPTER

V

It appears that we must
grant Plantinga the
consistency
of his intuitions, and
that, in view of that
consistency, hie

position withstands the
attacks which it was
designed to
withstand. However, -we
must do a bit of farther
investigation
before we can conclude that
we have been shown a
viable defense. The reason for
that is that there is one
attack
Which Plantings'
a position was not expressly
designed to
repel because Plantings
thought that it could be shown
mistaken on other grounds
entirely, and that is the
Maxwell's

angel attack.

As argued in chapter
II, though, the proposed

counter to that thrust is not
adequate, so we must now see
whether or not Plantinga's defense
as a matter of fact survives it anyway, since
considerations concerning that
point
will be more easily seen
within the ccntext of a formal
statement of Plantinga's defense,
it is to that that we now
turn.

Let

I

be a consistent set consisting
of!
simple propositions descriptive of Sod,
statements' of logical
law, and any other strictures
Sod might be subject
O, it any.
(in this latter category might
be*
certain general natural laws, etc.,
which though
non-logical might be necessary#)

Let s be a member of the set
S' of all sets of propositions
descriptive of states of affairs that it
is consistent that God strongly actualize
Let O' be any consistent set of
propositions descriptive of contingent states of affairs
not strongly
actualizable by God (and not contained in
I
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0

for

JO

is maximally consistent
and
avery S there is at least
one
is

O'

maximally consistent

Any such <1,

S,

such that
euch ttat I U o

Tl ?*,
U

^

0'> is, of course, simply
. „ 0 rld.

Any such <1, s',
0> will be a cluster.
Let f be a selector function
leading from each world to

»•

zii’
A

A

world structure is any
<1

mr
just
Vsl

,

S

i

#

Gf

f>

i.

#

a ° 1U8ter ln a "° rld
structure
in case the components
of that world are

contained within that cluster.

Clusters are the non-temporal
parallel of God's available
tree.

Every <S, O') constitutes what
can be intuitively associated with a branch of a tree.
I f in a cluster there
is some
3

such that there is exactly
one

a world,

O'

such that <1, S

then were God to do S out
of I,

o'

,

C »>

is

would result.

If

there is some S such that there
is more than one such
O', then
God cannot know in advance
what the result will be.

Again,

God must work within the bounds
of exactly one cluster, and

does not get to choose which.
looks like except that f(<*

)

We do not know what the cluster
is

the cluster in question.

In

general, everything that could formerly
be said in terms of
trees can now be translated into
non-temporal cluster terms.
For instance, if we decide that we
must allow worlds to differ

only in subjunctives, we can account
for the effect of that on
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God's creative abilities by
simply allowing f to vary otherwise, we can claim that
there is exactly one
world structure, and hold f rigid.

Clusters, then, can be viewed
as devices from which
we
can read off what results in each specific
cluster - So d
can attain. God, being
omnipotent, has available to
Him in

every cluster all possible
combinations of creative acts
performable (consistent with
His performing them) i. e .,
all Ss - but if a result
O'

is not contained

in the relevant

cluster, God cannot, within
that cluster, achieve that
result. The crucial point,
of course, is that it is con-

sistent to claim that God might
have to deal from a cluster
in which the o component
is lacking every O' which
is a constituent of a free perfect world,
or a 0 component which is

such that there is no s such that
there is a

o'

such that

<1, S, C'> is free perfect and such that there
is no
such that <1, 3,

o') is

O'

not free perfect.

Now let us see how the Maxwell's
angel problem might
handled.

be

Let us consider a world a which
though free is not

perfect - there are both good and
evil choices made.

suggestion

is

The

that the evil can be forestalled
by temporarily

removing the freedom of any agent who
otherwise is about to
go bad.
is

What we must notice, however, is that
if that freedom

removed, the resulting world is not
a - since in a there is
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evil,

i.e., the agent freely does
wrong.

But ln that ca8e

must be two different
maximal segments involved
- one
in which the agent is
created free relative to
the act, and
another (closely resembling
the first) in which the
agent is
not. The implied presumption
behind the objection is
that
Sod could (and should)
actualize the second, thus
getting a
perfect world, say b. Let us
call b the maxwellization
of
a and introduce a
maxwellization operator, e
.g.,
(

1

b

)

=

M(a

Suppose, now, that in the cluster
from which God is

actually working, a is available,
i.e.,
f(a) is the actual cluster

(2)

But then

i

•

6

(5)

(w)(3od can bring about w

(^)

(

—>

w is in f(a))

—>

f( w

• i

w ) ( God

can bring about w

Now the response emerges.

The objection

)

i8

=

f(a))

that if a

contains evil, God could create a
better free world by max-

wellizing a.
(5)

But

That God can create a implies that
God can
create M(a)

is true only if

(6)

f(a)

=

f(M(a))

and nothing concerning clusters guarantees
that.

In fact,
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were It true that were
God to actualize the
new maximal eo£ .
»ent, b' (in which the
agent goes bad relative
to see other
aot) would result, then
(6) is false.
The objection rests
upon the assumption that
if God can create some
world a,
then there is a distinct
perfect world b which has
certain
special features in common
with a and
God can create b too.

That assumption is not one
that has to be accepted,
and in
order to escape it all we
need do is
point out that it is

consistent to maintain that
there is a cluster

within

which the max well ization of any
world within that cluster
is absent.
Plantinga's defense,

then, provides for a re-

sponse to Maxwell's angel,

since every response in the

literature has been defective in
the manner discussed in
an earlier chapter, in this
respect alone Plantinga's defense represents a significant
advance.

There is one other noteworthy
consequence of Plantinga's
defense.

Recall that earlier it was seen
that one of the

hottest debates raged over whether
or not the evils that
existed were justified in the loose
sense that there were

counterbalancing goods that in some way
depended upon their
existence.

A common claim is that justified evil
does not

militate against God's existence, but that
unjustified evil
would, and that thus if there is unjustified
evil, God does

not exist.
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If we take the usual
intra-world interpretation
of justification, Plantings
defense gives us a way
of denying even
that. It is perfectly
consistent that there
be a cluster
containing no free world
lacking unjustified
evil, or no free
world lacking unjustified
evil not sharing
s with a world
containing unjustified evil,
were such a cluster facing
3od, He would, If He were
to create a free world,
have to
create a world containing
unjustified evil or have to
gamble
risking creating such a world.
Given the choices He would
have, His only moral
obligation might be to create
the best
of that bad lot in the first
instance, or in the second
instance to not gamble and to
create the best of those
He
could guarantee, or to gamble
and risk the odds on
getting
the world with unjustified
evil.
In any of these cases.
He
would have what we might call
a transworld justification
for

creating a world containing
unjustified evil,

since clusters

preserve His omnipotence - by
virtue of containing all the

relevant Ss - and since the proposed
case does not sacrifice
omniscience, the existence of the
resulting unjustified evil
(if it did result) would indicate
nothing of interest.
Thus whereas it has been generally
presumed that the
t heist

is

committed to denying the existence
of unjustified

evil, Plantings has given the
theiet a means for staking out

an even weaker, yet successful,
position.
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To conclude, it appears
that Plantings has
presented us
with the first workable
free will defense, that
it is the first
capable of avoiding certain
specific attacks, and that
it
places on the theist a liehter oKu
gnter obligation than
might have
been expected.
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CONCLUDING
autobiographical
note
have tried to ehow that
although we can nibble
around
the edges of Plantings'
e defense, the core
intuitions are
sound and can be modified
promisingly.
I

However, the foregoing
discussion has required the
aa sumption that
(l

^

We cannot be

)

<l0

to freely choose to do
good

° f frSed °"

some'evil

^

lt8 producte justifies

are compatible (implying, of
course, that each can be true).
While (ii) has drawn only
eporadic attention - possibly
becauae it

is

difficult to envision just how
an argument on

the question might go - (i) has
a long and unsettled history.

The arguments for and against
(i) have not been examined
here, but on this issue

In fact,

I

I

aide with Plantings - (i) seems
true.

believe that both (i) and (ii) are
true.

If the

foregoing chapters show that given
(i) and (ii) a defense can
be made, then if my intuitions
concerning (i) and (ii) are

reliable, the theist is in better shape
than some have thought.
I

am not going to here

males

any inferences employing that

last conditional, but it is perhaps
fair to say that the theist

need not call his game on account of darkness
just yet.
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